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IMMIGRATION LAW-THE CASE FOR NUNC PRO TUNC ADJU­
DICATION OF SECTION 212(c) ApPLICATIONS WRONGFULLY DE­
NIED BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
INTRODUCTION 
On October 22, 1996, Ramiro Fernandes Pereira appeared 
before an immigration judge.! He had been a lawful permanent 
resident of the United States for over twenty years, but was facing 
deportation after pleading guilty to a serious crime one year ear­
lier.2 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), Fermin­
des Pereira was considered an "alien" and the crime he had 
committed constituted an aggravated felony-a deportable of­
fense.3 To prevent his deportation, Fernandes Pereira applied for a 
waiver under INA section 212(c).4 
Section 212(c) provided criminal aliens with relief from depor­
tation at the discretion of the Attorney General.s If the waiver was 
granted to Fernandes Pereira, the grounds for his deportation 
would be eliminated and he could continue to reside in the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident.6 Earlier that same year, 
however, Congress had passed two separate statutes, the Antiter­
rorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)7 and the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),8 
repealing section 212(c). Although Fernandes Pereira would have 
1. Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2005), reh'g denied en 
bane, 436 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2006). 
2. ld. at 40. 
3. See id. 
4. ld. at 41. 
5. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414, tit. II, ch. 
2, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, tit. 
5, sub tit. A, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi­
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304, 
110 Stat. 3009-597 (1996). References to INA section 212(c) (which was codified at 8 
U.S.c. § 1182(c» are made to the 1995 version of the statute, prior to its revocation. 
6. See 6 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LoEHR, IM­
MIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 74.04[5], 74.66.5 to 74.66.6 (rev. ed. 2007). 
7. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 
104-132,110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Section 440(c) of the AEDPA barred aliens convicted of 
an aggravated felony from eligibility for a waiver under section 212(c). 6 GORDON, 
MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[1][b], at 74-35. 
8. IIRIRA, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
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been otherwise eligible for section 212( c) at the time of his hearing, 
the immigration judge concluded that the AEDPA and IIRIRA op­
erated retroactively to preclude relief to aliens who were convicted 
prior to their enactment.9 Since section 212(c) was no longer avail­
able to Fernandes Pereira, the immigration judge ordered him de­
ported. lO When Fernandes Pereira appealed to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA), the immigration judge's order was 
affirmed. l1 
The issue of retroactivity sparked a debate amongst the mem­
bers of the BIA that eventually spilled into the federal courts. Over 
time, the court of appeals in each circuit overturned the decision 
that applied the Acts retroactively.12 The Supreme Court also 
reached a similar result in 2001.13 With the support of these deci­
sions, Fernandes Pereira successfully moved the BIA to reopen his 
deportation proceedings.14 When he appeared before an immigra­
tion judge this time, the judge concluded that Fernandes Pereira 
was no longer eligible for section 212( c ).15 In order to be eligible 
for relief under section 212( c), an alien convicted of an aggravated 
felony could not have served more than five years in prison.16 By 
this time, Fernandes Pereira had been incarcerated for over five 
years. His petition for relief was denied once againY 
Undeterred, Fernandes Pereira filed a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus, seeking judicial review of the BIA's decision.18 His 
theory of relief was based on the equitable doctrine of nunc pro 
tunc, which means "now for then."19 Fernandes Pereira argued that 
a nunc pro tunc order should have the effect of bringing him back 
to the date of his first final deportation hearing, so that his applica­
9. Fernandes Pereira, 417 F.3d at 41. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. In In re Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. 516 (B.I.A. 1996), the BIA held that the 
AEDPA applied retroactively to preclude criminal aliens from eligibility for section 
212(c) relief after its effective date. As this line of cases came before the various courts 
of appeals, they overturned Soriano. See infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
13. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). 
14. Fernandes Pereira, 417 F.3d at 41. 
15. Id. at 42. 
16. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), Pub. L. No. 82-414 tit. II, ch. 
2, § 212(c), 66 Stat. 163, amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, tit. 
5, subtit. A, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 5052, repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi­
grant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304, 
110 Stat. 3009-597. 
17. Fernandes Pereira, 417 F.3d at 42. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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tion for section 212( c) could be properly heard-as if it were heard 
at the original time.20 The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 
however, did not agree that nunc pro tunc was an available remedy 
in this particular circumstance and dismissed Pereira's appeal,21 
Approximately seven months prior to the First Circuit's deci­
sion in Fernandes Pereira, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir­
cuit decided Edwards v. INS.22 Although the timing of events 
concerning the petitioners in Edwards was virtually identical to that 
of Fernandes Pereira, the petitioners were granted the nunc pro 
tunc opportunity to have their section 212(c) petitions heard.23 
Noting the enduring historical use of the nunc pro tunc doctrine in 
immigration law and the absence of specific congressional intent to 
preclude equitable relief, the Edwards court concluded that nunc 
pro tunc was properly awarded in such circumstances where agency 
delay prevented an alien from receiving relief that was rightfully 
deserved.24 
The next to weigh in on the issue was the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit.25 In reviewing the BIA's decision, the Fifth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals sided with the First Circuit in finding that it 
lacked the proper authority to employ the nunc pro tunc doctrine to 
remedy the erroneous denial of the petitioner's application for a 
section 212(c) waiver.26 The court distinguished between the scope 
of its own nunc pro tunc power and that of the BIA.27 Although 
the matter before the court was one concerning immigration, it 
found that it was not at liberty to exercise the same nunc pro tunc 
authority held by the BIA.28 The case was remanded to the BIA to 
address whether the BIA's nunc pro tunc authority was available to 
remedy the error.29 In doing so, the court held that if nunc pro tunc 
was allowed by the BIA, "then it could be used to reinstate [the 
petitioner]'s eligibility. "30 
Whether a nunc pro tunc remedy is appropriately applied to 
restore the availability of section 212( c) for criminal aliens is the 
20. Id. at 46-48. 
21. Id. at 47. 
22. Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2004). 
23. Id. at 312. 
24. Id. at 308-12. 
25. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2007). 
26. Id. at 678-79. 
27. /d. at 677-79. 
28. /d. at 677. 
29. Id. at 679. 
30. Id. at 679 n.9. 
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origin of a split between the Courts of Appeals for the First and 
Second Circuits.31 While a case on point came before the Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, it concluded that the BIA should de­
cide the issue and remanded the case.32 This Note proposes that 
nunc pro tunc relief should be afforded to those in circumstances 
similar to Fernandes Pereira who pled guilty to a deportable of­
fense at a time when section 212( c) was still available. The conclu­
sion presented is based on a crucial observation made by Justice 
Stevens that "there is a clear difference ... between facing possible 
deportation and facing certain deportation."33 By applying the 
1996 Acts retroactively, and thereby eliminating their eligibility to 
receive section 212(c) relief, these aliens are now faced with no pos­
sibility of relief and certain deportation. 
Part I of this Note begins with a short discussion of the devel­
opment of immigration law in the United States. This discussion 
covers the doctrine of plenary power and the limits of judicial re­
view under the administrative umbrella of the former Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS), now reorganized into the Depart­
ment of Homeland Security (DRS) and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), which review immigration decisions.34 The discussion next 
moves to the deportation power delegated to the former INS by 
Congress and, more importantly, relief from deportation under sec­
tion 212(c). 
Part II examines the general concept of nunc pro tunc and the 
divergent views on the scope of its use. This Part also emphasizes 
31. Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38, 46-48 (1st Cir. 2005), reh'g denied 
en bane, 436 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2006). See generally Corey M. Dennis, Comment, Nunc 
Pro Tunc Relief Unavailable Where Erroneous Legal Interpretation Rendered Alien Inel­
igible for Deportation Waiver-Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (Ist Cir. 2005),40 SUF­
FOLK U. L. REV. 1049 (2007). 
32. Romero-Rodriguez, 488 F.3d at 679-80. 
33. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325 (2001) (emphasis added). 
34. In March 2003, the agency known as the Immigration and Naturalization Ser­
vice (INS) was effectively abolished and its functions were transferred to the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE­
LOEHR, supra note 6, at SAl-I. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 divided the func­
tions of the former INS into three bureaus: the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (BCIS, sometimes referred to as the United States Citizenship and Immigra­
tion Services, or US CIS), the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(BlCE), and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP). Id. Some immi­
gration procedures, such as the BIA and the immigration judges, remained within the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and others remained with the Department of State 
(DOS). /d.; see also Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 
2135. Many of the cases discussed in this Note began while the INS was still in exis­
tence, and some have continued beyond its dissolution and the creation of the DHS. 
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the special application of nunc pro tunc in the immigration context. 
Next, Part III covers the decisions by the three courts of appeals 
that have encountered this issue. Part IV argues that nunc pro tunc 
is a remedy supported by volumes of INS case law and should be 
applied under circumstances like those in Fernandes Pereira to en­
sure the equitable and just administration of immigration law. Fi­
nally, Part V demonstrates how the doctrine of nunc pro tunc 
should be applied in order to properly restore these petitioners' 
rights. 
I. IMMIGRATION, DEPORTATION, AND THE SECTION 212(c) 
WAIVER FROM DEPORTATION 
This Part provides a brief glimpse into the unique and complex 
nature of immigration law. First, it discusses the special constitu­
tional status of immigration law. Second, it focuses on deporta­
tion-its definition and consequences. This Part ends with an 
overview of section 212(c) of the INA, the repeal of which has been 
the subject of much litigation. 
A. A Selected History of Immigration Law 
1. 	 The Tumultuous Relationship Between Immigration Law 
and the Constitution 
Immigration law is a notorious constitutional rogue.35 Since 
the first Chinese exclusion laws were enacted in 1882,36 courts have 
35. As a flagrant constitutional nonconformist, immigration law has been de­
scribed as "a maverick, a wild card, in our public law," Peter H. Schuck, The Transfor­
mation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984), a "constitutional oddity," 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional 
Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 255 (1984), and "a wart on the face of mainstream 
constitutional law," David M. Grable, Note, Personhood Under the Due Process Clause: 
A Constitutional Analysis of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 1mmigrant Responsibil­
ity Act of 1996, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 820, 854 (1998). 
36. Entitled "An act to execute certain treaty stipulations relating to Chinese," 
the statute declared a ten-year suspension period during which Chinese laborers were 
prohibited from entering the country. The Act also prohibited the master of any vessel 
from knowingly transporting a Chinese laborer into the country. Although the Act did 
not apply to the Chinese already in the country, they were required to be registered 
with the collector of customs in their district so that they could receive a certificate of 
identification that would entitle them to reenter the United States if they chose to de­
part for any reason. The 1882 Act was followed by legislation in 1884 and again in 1888 
that voided any certificates issued to Chinese laborers for reentrance into the country. 
The problem of Chinese laborers holding certificates who had been outside of the 
United States when Congress changed the law was at issue in the infamous Chinese 
Exclusion Case of Chae Chan Ping. Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese 
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,597-99 (1889). For more about the Chinese exclusion 
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rationalized blatant congressional discrimination as the legislative 
branch's prerogative.37 It has also long been recognized that "[i]n 
the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigra­
tion, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if 
applied to citizens."38 Criticism of the "plenary power" that Con­
gress has enjoyed in immigration regulation demonstrates the ten­
sion between the nation's desire to secure its borders and protect its 
sovereignty while respecting the rights given to all "persons" under 
its Constitution.39 Allegations of equal protection violations are 
met with the response that "Congress has plenary authority to regu­
late matters of immigration and naturalization, and its authority ex­
tends to the classification of aliens as a basis for determining their 
eligibility to enter or remain in the United States."40 
Grounded in precedent, Congress's plenary power to regulate 
immigration has never been refuted by the Supreme Court.41 The 
Court has, however, displayed more recent reluctance to endorse 
the traditional doctrine of absolute power.42 Although it is limited, 
the Court has recognized a justification for judicial scrutiny.43 Per-
laws and their effect on the plight of Chinese immigrants in America, see generally 
ESTELLE T. LAU, PAPER FAMILIES: IDENTITY, IMMIGRATION ADMINISTRATION, AND 
CHINESE EXCLUSION (2006). 
37. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606-11. Writing for a unanimous 
Supreme Court, Justice Field asserted 
[t]hat the government of the United States, through the action of the legisla­
tive department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposition which we 
do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that 
extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its 
independence. 
Id. at 603-04; see also Will Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Re­
form, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 319 (1956) ("The [Supreme] Court has frequently pro­
claimed in its most sweeping language the plenary power of Congress in dealing with 
aliens, once stating that 'over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Con­
gress more complete ....'" (quoting Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Strahan, 214 
U.S. 320, 339 (1909))). 
38. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976). 
39. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o 
state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
40. Giusto v. INS, 9 F.3d 8, 9 (2d Cir. 1993). 
41. Legomsky, supra note 35, at 291. 
42. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 71.02[3][a]; see also 
Legomsky, supra note 35, at 303. 
43. See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787,792 (1977) (discussing the exercise of 
Congress's "exceptionally broad power" to define classes of admissible aliens may be 
subject to "narrow judicial review" in extreme cases); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 
U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (despite "paramount federal power over immigration and naturali­
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haps the most effective constitutional challenges to immigration 
laws, especially those concerning deportation, have been invoked 
under the Due Process Clause.44 The Court has clearly recognized 
that the deportation process must observe procedural due pro­
cess.45 However, "the scope of procedural protection afforded by 
the Due Process Clause is a function of, inter alia, the magnitude of 
the individual interest at stake."46 It is presumed that aliens seek­
ing initial entrance into the country have less at stake than those 
who have resided in the country for a period of time as lawful per­
manent residents.47 The Court has also been resolute in asserting 
exclusive federal jurisdiction over immigration matters, justifying 
such exclusivity by citing immigration's effects on foreign policy and 
uniformity of rules between states.48 
2. Deportation 
Deportation49 is the expulsion of an alien who has entered the 
zation," broad discrimination justifies "some judicial scrutiny"). Outside the issue of 
immigration, the Supreme Court has upheld the rights of alien children of illegal immi­
grants to educational benefits and prohibited withholding welfare benefits based on 
alienage under the Equal Protection Clause. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). As the Supreme Court explained: 
The Fourteenth Amendment ... is not confined to the protection of citi­
zens.... [Its] provisions are universal in their application ... without regard 
to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection 
of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). 
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law ...."). 
45. Legomsky, supra note 35, at 259; see, e.g., Yamataya v. Fisher (The Japanese 
Immigrant Case), 189 U.S. 86 (1903). Procedural due process rights appear to be the 
extent of the rights that courts are willing to confer on aliens in deportation proceed­
ings. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993) ("It is well established that the Fifth 
Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings."). This 
right has been recognized since The Japanese Immigrant Case. Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 
662, 666 (7th Cir. 1993). As the court in Linnas v. INS stated, "Congress has broad 
authority over the status of aliens, and there is no substantive due process right not to 
be deported." Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1031 (2d Cir. 1986); see, e.g., Galvan v. 
Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590-91 
(1952); Bassett v. INS, 581 F.2d 1385, 1386-87 (10th Cir. 1978). 
46. Legomsky, supra note 35, at 261. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 264-67; see, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclu­
sion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 600-09 (1889); Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money Cases), 
112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). 
49. For purposes of this Note, the terms removal and deportation will be used 
interchangeably. Although the term "removal" was designated to refer to both "depor­
tation" and "exclusion" after 1996 by the IIRIRA, it has been used by courts mostly to 
refer to deportation in the pre-1996 sense, in that it is the process for removing aliens 
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United States either legally or illegally.50 An "alien" is defined by 
the INA as "any person not a citizen or national of the United 
States."51 Although there is no specific power to deport recognized 
in the U.S. Constitution, the courts have declared that this power is 
inherent in the concept of sovereignty and critical for national 
sec uri ty. 52 
A well-established tenet of immigration law is that the nature 
of deportation is civil and administrative, not criminal.53 This dis­
tinction carries several critical consequences. Since deportation is 
not regarded as a criminal proceeding, it is not considered to be 
punishment.54 This notion is what some call a "legal fiction" be­
cause of the difficulty in reconciling this civil classification with real­
ity.55 Despite the frequent call to "wipe the slate clean,"56 courts 
physically present in the United States. 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra 
note 6, § 1.03[4J[a], at 1-34. 
50. 6 id. § 71.01[1], at 71-6. 
51. INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.c. § 1l01(a)(3) (2000). The distinction between a citi­
zen and a lawful permanent resident (noncitizen) is, arguably, a mere difference in 
paperwork. The concept of "citizenship," which is tantamount to "membership," is a 
creation by people. It is "a legal construct, an abstraction, a theory." DAVID COLE, 
ENEMY ALIENS 216 (2003) (quoting Yale Law Professor Alexander Bickel writing 
about Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), and postulating that when a relation­
ship between government and its people is based on citizenship, it can be "dissolved or 
denied" because of this abstract nature of citizenship). 
52. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 71.02[1], at 71-18 to 
71-19; see Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924) ("The right to expel aliens is a sover­
eign power necessary to the safety of the country, and only limited by treaty obligations 
in respect thereto entered into with other governments."). 
53. Schuck, supra note 35, at 24-27. 
54. Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ("[D]eportation [is not] a pun­
ishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons whom it does not 
want."). The Court has also stated that 
[t]he order of deportation is not a punishment for crime. It is not a banish­
ment, in the sense in which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a 
citizen from his country by way of punishment. It is but a method of enforcing 
the return to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the condi­
tions upon the performance of which the government of the nation, acting 
within its constitutional authority and through the proper departments, has 
determined that his continuing to reside here shall depend. 
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). 
55. Some would argue that deportation is indeed punishment and that it is illogi­
cal to conclude otherwise. Its characterization as a civil remedy has been criticized as 
insensitive to the realities of a deportee's plight: "The government's obligations to the 
alien are viewed as resting upon her formal status rather than upon her actual relation­
ship to the society." Schuck, supra note 35, at 27. 
56. In Galvan v. Press, Justice Frankfurter illustrated the struggle between the 
exercise of sovereignty and substantive due process: 
In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process as a 
limitation upon all powers of Congress, ... much could be said for the view, 
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have maintained this position.57 As a noncriminal, nonpunitive 
sanction, deportation eludes many constitutional constraints such as 
the protections of the Sixth Amendment, which are limited to crim­
inal proceedings.58 Likewise, the prohibition of ex post facto laws 
under Article I, Section 9, is inapplicable to deportation proceed­
ings.59 Other limitations include the applicability of the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule,60 the allocation of the burden of 
proof, and the right to judicial review.61 This distinction allows the 
process of deportation to escape constitutional scrutiny and leaves 
were we writing on a clean slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the 
scope of political discretion heretofore recognized as belonging to Congress in 
regulating the entry and deportation of aliens. And since the intrinsic conse­
quences of deportation are so close to punishment for crime, it might fairly be 
said also that the ex post facto Clause, even though applicable only to punitive 
legislation, should be applied to deportation. 
But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress 
under review, there is not merely "a page of history," New York Trust Co. v. 
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345,349 [(1921)], but a whole volume. Policies pertaining to 
the entry of aliens and their right to remain here are peculiarly concerned with 
the political conduct of government. . .. [T]hat the formulation of these poli­
cies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded 
in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our 
government. And whatever might have been said at an earlier date for apply­
ing the ex post facto Clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this Court that it 
has no application to deportation. 
Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1954) (citation omitted). See generally Nancy 
Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97 (1998) (discussing how retroactive deportation laws violate the Due 
Process Clause). 
57. Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1531 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sarokin, J., concur­
ring) ("I suggest that now is the time to wipe the slate clean and admit to the long 
evident reality that deportation is punishment."); see also Fang Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 
741 (Brewer, J., dissenting) ("[I]f a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and 
among the most severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to which 
the name can be applied."). 
58. Schuck, supra note 35, at 25; see, e.g., Mantell v. INS, 798 F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 
1986) (holding that the right to counsel under Sixth Amendment is inapplicable to de­
portation proceedings); Argiz v. INS, 704 F.2d 384, 387 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that the 
right to speedy trial under Sixth Amendment is inapplicable to deportation). 
59. E.g., Galvan, 347 U.S. at 530-32 (holding that the Ex Post Facto Clause does 
not apply to deportation because it is nonpunitive); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 
580, 594 (1952) (" 'The inhibition against the passage of an ex post facto law by Con­
gress in section 9 of article 1 of the Constitution applies only to criminal laws ... and 
not to a deportation act like this ....'" (quoting Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 
(1924))). 
60. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (holding that the exclusionary 
rule barring admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is 
not applicable to deportation proceedings). 
61. Schuck, supra note 35, at 25. 
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many aliens without the fundamental rights bestowed upon Ameri­
can citizens. 
Grounds for deportation were originally viewed as supplemen­
tary to the early exclusionary laws, but have since significantly ex­
panded in their scope.62 The INA of 1952 categorized deportable 
aliens into nineteen general classes, many of which included multi­
ple subclasses.63 In 1990, the Immigration Act reorganized the 
grounds for deportation into six categories:64 (1) "actions to uphold 
the integrity of the admissions process"; (2) penalization of "post­
entry conviction of certain crimes," including drug offenses and vio­
lations of domestic protection orders; (3) purposeful and unexcused 
failure to provide personal information or valid documentation; (4) 
national security related grounds, including espionage, sabotage, 
and terrorist activities; (5) causes predating entry or "becoming a 
public charge within five years" of admission; and (6) voting with­
out authorization.65 
The consequences of deportation vary depending on the 
grounds of deportability.66 A five-year bar to admission would ap­
ply to aliens removed for attempting to enter the country with 
fraudulent documents or by misrepresentation of material facts.67 
A separate ten-year bar is applicable to aliens who were ordered 
removed under INA section 240.68 For a second or subsequent or­
der of removal, the bar is twenty years.69 For aliens removed on 
account of an aggravated felony conviction, the bar is permanent.7o 
Aliens who are eligible for readmission must observe a mandatory 
waiting period before applying for reentry?1 Deportation ends the 
continuity of an alien's lawful residence, which is necessary to apply 
for naturalization, and terminates the consideration of a pending 
62. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 6, § 71.01[1], at 71-6; see 
also Maslow, supra note 37, at 231. 
63. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 6, § 71.01[2][b][iii], at 
71-7. 
64. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.c. § 1227(a) (2000). 
65. 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 6, § 1.03[3][b], at 1-33. 
66. Id. 
67. INA § 237(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i). 
68. Section 240 of the INA pertains to removal proceedings. Under section 
240(a)(2), an alien placed in section 240 removal proceedings may be charged with any 
grounds for either inadmissibility or deportability described under INA sections 237(a) 
and 212(a) respectively. INA § 240(a)(2), 8 U.S.c. § 1229a(a)(2). 
69. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 71.01[4][c], at 71-18. 
70. [d. 
71. Id. 
599 2008] NUNC PRO TUNC ADJUDICATION OF SECTION 212(c) 
application for naturalization.72 Once deported, an alien who reen­
ters the country without permission may face criminal charges or 
may be summarily removed.73 
Depending on the status of the alien74 and the grounds for de­
portation, certain remedies are available to avoid expUlsion from 
the country. Possible remedies range from a motion to reopen re­
moval proceedings or an application for a stay of deportation,75 to 
an application for asylum and withholding of removaP6 A com­
mon way to obtain relief from removal is an adjustment of status.77 
An adjustment of status allows an alien to change his status to that 
of a lawful permanent resident at the discretion of the Attorney 
GeneraP8 Adjustment of status is only available to aliens who 
gained admission after undergoing the inspection and admission 
process and were properly paroled into the United States.79 There 
are several other forms of relief that come at the discretion of the 
government.80 Discretionary forms of relief generally have two 
components: statutory eligibility requirements and the exercise of 
discretion by the government.81 One form of discretionary relief 
existed under section 212(c) of the INA. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. The alien could be an illegal entrant, a refugee, a lawful permanent resident, a 
professional workers' visa holder, or a student visa holder, just to name some of the 
possibilities of an alien's status. 
75. A person ordered deported may, in an emergency, apply for a stay of deporta­
tion under 8 C.F.R. § 241.6 (2006). The INS may even defer deportation in "compas­
sionate" cases. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 6, § 72.08[1][c], at 
72-205; see also 1 id. § 1.03[4][a], at 1-34. 
76. Asylum and withholding of removal are available to persons threatened with 
persecution in their home countries because of their race, religion, nationality, member­
ship in a certain social group, or political opinion, and are already in the United States. 
Those who are eligible may apply for asylum pursuant to INA § 208, 8 U.S.c. § 1158, 
and withholding of removal (which is now termed "nonrefoulment," as consistent with 
the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees) under INA 
§ 124(b)(2), 8 U.S.c. § 1251(b)(3). 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 
6, § 1.03[5][b], [e), at 1-41. 
77. Id. § 1.03[4][b], at 1-35. 
78. INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.c. § 1254(a) (2000). 
79. For an additional $1000 fee, an alien who entered without inspection or ad­
mission may become eligible for adjustment under INA § 245(i). 1 GORDON, MAILMAN 
& YALE-LOEHR, supra note 6, § 1.03[4][b], at 1-35. 
80. Other forms of discretionary relief include suspension of deportation, waiver 
of misrepresentations in seeking entry, asylum or withholding of deportation, tempo­
rary release from custody, waiver of inadmissibility to remove ineligibility or other re­
lief, and relief relating to alien entrepreneurs and their families. 6 id. § 72.04[6], at 72­
128 to 72-134. 
81. INA § 240(c)(4)(A), 8 U.S.c. § 1229(a). 
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3. Relief from Deportation: The Section 212( c) 
Discretionary Waiver 
The predecessor to section 212( c) of the INA-section 3 of the 
Immigration Act of 1917-gave the Secretary of Labor82 discretion 
to admit aliens who would otherwise be excludable.83 The provi­
sion applied to aliens returning to the United States after a tempo­
rary absence to an "unrelinquished ... domicile of 7 consecutive 
years."84 Although the provision was only literally applicable to ex­
clusion proceedings, the BIA adopted an interpretation that also 
applied the waiver to deportation proceedings.85 
The application of section 212( c) to deportation has made an 
important difference in immigration proceedings due to the broad 
definition of deportable offenses under immigration law.86 Because 
deportable offenses encompass such a wide range of activities, from 
acts of "moral turpitude"87 to those classified as aggravated felo­
nies,88 a large class of lawful permanent residents are potentially 
82. Immigration was originally under the purview of the Department of Labor, 
thus giving authority over deportation to the Secretary of Labor. The INS was created 
in 1933 under the Department of Labor. See LAU, supra note 36, at 14-15. When the 
INS was transferred to the Department of Justice in 1940, the powers vested in the 
Secretary of Labor were transferred to the Attorney General. Id. 
83. Immigration Act of 1917, § 3, 39 Stat. 875. 
84. In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 5 (B.I.A. 1940). 
85. In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (B.I.A. 1976) (adopting the holding in 
Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976)). In Francis, the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that the BIA's refusal to permit section 212(c) eligibility to a peti­
tioner who was subject to deportation proceedings, and not exclusion proceedings, was 
based on a distinction without "any legitimate governmental interest" and, therefore, 
unconstitutional. Francis, 532 F.2d at 273. 
86. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 295 (2001). In order to be eligible for the section 
212(c) waiver in a deportation proceeding, there must be a corresponding ground for 
exclusion. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 14:30 (2d ed. 2007); see 
also Carol eo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 168 (3d Cir. 2007); Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 
58,62 (1st Cir. 2006). But see Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 105 (2d Cir. 2007) (con­
cluding that the BIA should focus on the petitioners' particular offenses rather than the 
grounds for deportation). 
87. Although Congress did not specifically define "moral turpitude," deference is 
given to the immigration agency's interpretation of the term (under Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)), which defines it as 
"an act which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong, or malum in se, so 
it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it which renders a 
crime one of moral turpitude." Wei Cong Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 
2004) (quoting In re Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 949,950 (B.I.A. 1999)). 
88. The concept of an "aggravated felony" was first introduced in the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181. 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & 
YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 2.04[10][b], at 2-34. The definition of aggravated felony 
under the Act included murder, drug trafficking, and illicit trafficking of firearms. Id. 
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deportable, many of whom have committed minor offenses and 
have many countervailing equities in their favor.89 
Prior to 1996, an alien in deportation proceedings could apply 
for a waiver from deportation under section 212(c) of the INA.90 
The waiver constituted a discretionary judgment by the Attorney 
General as to whether or not the criminal alien should be allowed a 
waiver from deportation. If relief was granted on the merits of the 
alien's claim, the cause of excludability or deportability was extin­
guished and the alien was returned to the same lawful resident sta­
tus that he previously held.91 Once granted, the waiver was valid 
indefinitely.92 
Under section 212(c), the alien must meet several statutory re­
quirements in order to be eligible for the waiver. First, the alien 
had to have been "[l]awfully admitted for permanent residence" in 
the United States.93 In other words, the alien had to be a lawful 
permanent resident. Second, the alien had to have maintained an 
"unrelinquished ... domicile of seven consecutive years" in the 
United States.94 Section 212(c) remained free from substantial 
change from the time of its enactment in 1952 until 1990.95 The 
Immigration Act of 1990 added, among other things, another crite­
rion for section 212( c) eligibility:96 aliens convicted of an aggra­
89. See Maslow, supra note 37, at 323 ("When an alien has come to the United 
States as a child and has been reared in this country, it is particularly unjust to ship him 
to some foreign land for a transgression that is in part the result of our environment and 
culture."). See generally Melissa Cook, Note, Banished for Minor Crimes: The Aggra­
vated Felony Provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a Human Rights Viola­
tion, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 293 (2003). 
90. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 321(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009-628 (amending INA 
§ 101(a)(43), codified at 8 U.S.c. § 1101(a)(43) (2000)). 
91. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[5), at 74-66.5 to 
74-66.7. 
92. 8 C.F.R. § 212.3(d) (2008). 
93. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[l)[a), at 74-34. 
94. Id. Congress also decided to adopt a recommendation to include an addi­
tional requisite for section 212(c) eligibility. The alien could not have been excludable 
on subversive charges. Id. Since this is not a determinative factor in the line of cases 
involved in this Note, it will not be discussed. 
95. Id. 
96. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 511(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5052 
(1990). Although the 1990 Act did not specify the effective date after which aggravated 
felony convictions would bar section 212(c) relief, the BIA and every circuit court to 
deliberate on the issue held that the 1990 Act worked retroactively to apply to aggra­
vated felony convictions originally defined by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 but 
occurring before its effective date of November 29, 1990. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & 
YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[2)[f), at 74-51; see, e.g., In re Gomez-Giraldo, 20 I. 
& N. Dec. 957,963 (B.I.A. 1995); In re A-A-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 492, 500 (B.I.A. 1992); 
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vated felony could not have served more than five years in prison 
for the offense.97 
Obtaining a waiver was a hard-fought battle. The alien was 
charged with the task of presenting social and humane considera­
tions as to why he should remain in the country to outweigh his 
undesirability as a U.S. resident or citizen.98 Among the discretion­
ary factors that would weigh against a section 212( c) petitioner's 
interest were: the severity of the deportable offense; substantial in­
fringement of the immigration laws; the nature, recency, and gravity 
of any criminal record; and any circumstances evidencing poor 
character or undesirability as a U.S. resident.99 Favorable factors 
that could be considered included: ties to family and community in 
the United States; extended residency; hardship or burden to the 
petitioner and petitioner's family; service in the military; employ­
ment record; community involvement; evidence of good moral 
character (through supporting affidavits from the petitioner's fam­
ily, friends, and community members); and verification of rehabili­
tation if the petitioner had a criminal record.lOo The process of 
balancing adverse factors against favorable factors was carefully un­
dertaken by immigration judges and the BIA.lOl Each decision was 
to be fully articulated to demonstrate that it had been reached 
through thoughtful and meaningful deliberation-otherwise, it 
could have been attacked as an abuse of discretion.102 
see also Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517, 1520 (3d Cir. 1996); Ignacio v. INS, 955 F.2d 
295, 298 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). 
97. Both the AEDPA and IIRIRA expanded the definition of "aggravated fel­
ony," which has also been a cause for litigation, both because offenses that constitute an 
aggravated felony vary from state to state, Peter Adomeit, Identical Acts, Different Re­
sults, W. MASS. L. TRIB., Nov. 2006, at 10, and by those protesting the retroactive ef­
fects of the legislation, see 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, 
§ 74.04[2][f][i], at 74-51. 
98. In re Soriano, 21 1. & N. Dec. 516, 528 (B.LA. 1996) (Rosenberg, Board 
Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
99. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[2][g], at 74-54 to 
74-55. 
100. Id. § 74.04[2][g], at 74-55; see also Cortes-Castillo v. INS, 997 F.2d 1199, 1203 
(7th Cir. 1993). 
101. 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[2][g], at 74-55. 
102. /d. In Anderson v. McElroy, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the BIA's denial of the petitioner's request for consideration for section 212(c) 
relief by finding the BIA's decision to be an abuse of discretion: 
When faced with cursory, summary or conclusory statements from the BIA, 
we cannot presume anything other than ... an abuse of discretion, since "the 
BIA's denial of relief can be affirmed only on the basis articulated in the deci­
sion ... and we cannot assume that the BIA considered factors that it failed to 
mention in its decision." 
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While obtaining a section 212( c) waiver was difficult, it was 
"the most extensive waiver provision of U.S. immigration law"I03 
and an important form of relief for many aliens facing deportation. 
Between the years of 1989 and 1995, relief under section 212(c) was 
granted to over 10,000 applicants.104 
Congress, however, continued with its trend of limiting the 
availability of section 212(c) with the AEDPA in 1996.105 Section 
440( d) of the AEDPA placed an outright ban on aggravated felons 
applying for section 212( c) relief.106 The IIRIRA, also passed in 
1996, repealed section 212(c) completely and replaced it with an 
analogous form of relief for which aggravated felons were not 
eligible.107 
B. 	 Soriano to St. Cyr: The Debate on Retroactivity and Statutory 
Interpretation 
It is a long-standing principle that retroactivity is contrary to 
public expectation and leads to extreme unfairness.108 Throughout 
its history, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that 
"[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law."109 Unless expressly pro­
vided in the language of the statute, there is a presumption against 
retroactivity.IIO This presumption rests on the idea that if Congress 
has enacted a law and expressly provided for retroactive applica­
tion, then it has already considered the potential unfairness and de-
Anderson v. McElroy, 953 F.2d 803,806 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 
965, 967 (9th Cir. 1985». 
103. 	 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[1][a], at 74-35. 
104. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 296 n.5 (2001) (citing Julie K. Rannik, The Anti­
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: A Death Sentence for the 212(c) 
Waiver, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 123, 150 n.80 (1996». 
105. 	 6 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 74.04[1][b], at 74-35. 
106. Section 440(d) of the AEDPA barred relief under INA section 212(c) for any 
alien deportable for having committed any criminal offense constituting an aggravated 
felony, certain controlled substances and firearms offenses, as well as other miscellane­
ous crimes. 1 id. § 2.04[14][b][v], at 2-69. This essentially barred section 212(c) for 
virtually anyone convicted of a crime. The AEDPA also added a new INA section 
242A(c) providing that an alien convicted of an aggravated felony would be "conclu­
sively presumed" to be deportable. Id. § 2.04[14][b][vi], at 2-70. 
107. 	 Id. The new form of relief was called "cancellation of removaL" [d. 
108. In re Soriano, 21 l. & N. Dec. 516, 523 (B.l.A. 1996) (Rosenberg, Board 
Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
109. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988); see also Sori­
ano, 21 l. & N. Dec. at 523. 
110. Landsgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994). See generally 
Morawetz, supra note 56; Anjali Parekh Prakash, Note, Changing the Rules: Arguing 
Against Retroactive Application of Deportation Statutes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420 (1997). 
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termined that the benefits of applying the law retroactively 
outweigh such potential for unfairness.111 
Aware of the tension between immigration law and the Consti­
tution, Congress had to be careful when drafting the laws affecting 
immigration in 1996. The IIRIRA provided that any section 212(c) 
relief would not be available to those who had been convicted of 
deportable offenses, regardless of the date of their conviction. 
However, the Act included a "saving provision," which excluded 
application of its amendments to removal proceedings in progress 
prior to its effective date of April 1, 1997.112 While Congress had 
been explicit in directing how certain provisions were to be applied, 
the retroactive effect of the repeal of section 212(c) was ambigu­
OUS.ll3 As such, it was left open to interpretation by the BIA and 
the courts. 
1. In re Soriano 
In a pivotal decision concerning Bartolome Jhonny Soriano, an 
alien in deportation proceedings in 1996 when the AEDPA was en­
acted, the BIA construed section 440(d) of the AEDPA to apply 
immediately, even to deportation proceedings already in pro­
gressP4 Dissenting board members argued that this interpretation 
had an impermissible retroactive effect on actions predating the 
1996 law, for example, making a decision to plead guilty to a crime 
that is a deportable offense.115 
111. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289,316 (2001) (quoting LandsgraJ, 511 U.S. at 272­
73). Deference is usually given to the agency when interpreting its statutes, but the 
Court stated, "We only defer, however, to agency interpretations of statutes that, apply­
ing the normal 'tools of statutory construction,' are ambiguous." Id. at 321 n.45 (dis­
cussing and quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 n.9 (1984». 
112. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. II, § 321(c), 110 Stat. 3009-628. 
113. For example, section 413(g) of the AEDPA expressly states that the provi­
sion that applies to applications for asylum of alien terrorists are effective for those 
"before, on, or after" the effective date of the Act. Soriano, 211. & N. Dec. at 520; see 
also Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 286 (1st Cir. 1999). 
114. Soriano, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 519. The basis of this decision was due to the 
absence of language stating that the section would have only prospective effect. 
115. Id. at 528 (Rosenberg, Board Member, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Board Member Rosenberg opined that individuals did have "settled expecta­
tions" of section 212(c) as an available remedy when they decided to enter into a guilty 
plea or make other trial or appellate choices (not at the point of choosing to engage in 
criminal activity). Id. at 527. Rosenberg reasoned that without express direction from 
Congress, settled expectations should not be disturbed by giving retroactive effect to 
section 440(d) of the AEDPA where its application would attach new legal conse­
quences to conduct and events already completed prior to its enactment. Id. at 529-30. 
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Cases following Soriano relied on the BIA's interpretation that 
section 440( d) of the AEDPA was effective immediately and appli­
cable to aliens already in deportation proceedings at the time of its 
enactment.116 Controversy among the federal courts ensued, and 
eventually a majority came to disagree with the BIA's conclusion in 
Soriano. 117 Depending on the judicial circuit in which the deporta­
tion proceedings were held, different rules applied. In response to 
this uneven effect, a rule was published by the Executive Office of 
Immigration Review (EOIR)118 on January 22,2001, in an attempt 
to make the availability of section 212(c) relief uniform.119 Despite 
this rule, an issue remained as to whether an alien subject to depor­
tation by reason of a criminal conviction prior to the 1996 acts, but 
not in deportation proceedings until after their respective effective 
dates, would be eligible for section 212( c) relief. The Supreme 
Court addressed this question in INS v. St. Cyr.120 
2. INS v. St. Cyr 
In rejecting the INS's contention that the IIRIRA provisions 
were clearly intended to apply to deportation proceedings initiated 
Rosenberg further postulated that due process and fundamental fairness required that 
applications for section 212(c) should be accepted nunc pro tunc, even if made after 
April 26, 1996. Id. at 528. Rosenberg's reasoning was later referenced by the Supreme 
Court in deciding St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324 n.52. 
116. E.g., Ozoanya v. Reno, 979 F. Supp. 447 (W.D. La. 1997); see also Vashti D. 
Van Wyke, Comment, Retroactivity and Immigrant Crimes Since St. Cyr: Emerging 
Signs of Judicial Restraint, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 751 n.57 (2006). 
117. The issue of whether the AEDPA applies to deportation proceedings pend­
ing at the time of enactment has mostly been settled by other circuits, which have con­
cluded that it does not. See Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 287 (1st Cir. 1999); Pak v. 
Reno, 196 F.3d 666, 673 (6th Cir. 1999); Mayers v. U.S. Dep't of INS, 175 F.3d 1289, 
1304 (11th Cir. 1999); Sandoval v. Reno, 166 F.3d 225, 242 (3d Cir. 1999); Henderson v. 
INS, 157 F.3d 106, 130 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 614 
(9th Cir. 1999); Shah v. Reno, 184 F.3d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1999). 
118. The EOIR supervises the BIA, the Chief Immigration Judge, and the Chief 
Administrative Hearing Officer. The immigration judges work under the Chief Immi­
gration Judge and the administrative law judges work under the Chief Administrative 
Hearing Officer. 1 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 3.04, at 3­
36.11. 
119. Section 212(c) Relief for Certain Aliens in Deportation Proceedings Before 
April 24, 1996,66 Fed. Reg. 6436 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3,212, 240). 
Despite the rule, litigation persisted, as there were unanticipated permutations of cir­
cumstances surrounding aliens' claims for section 212(c) relief. The courts are stillliti­
gating section 212(c) applications for relief in 2008, over ten years after the 1996 
legislations. E.g., De Araujo v. Gonzales, 457 F.3d 146 (1st Cir. 2006); Fernandes Per­
eira v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2006); Montrevil v. Gonzales, 174 F. App'x 751 
(4th Cir. 2006). 
120. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289. 
606 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:589 
after the effective date of the statute and that the provisions oper­
ate prospectively and not retrospectively, the Court implied that 
Congress's intent is not conclusive.121 Further, the Court suggested 
that the statute operates to impose an unallowable retroactive ef­
fect on aliens who, in reliance on the availability of the section 
212(c) waiver, pled guilty to aggravated felonies. 122 The Court went 
on to discuss the special concerns raised by retroactively effective 
statutes and the strong presumption against them: 
[This] presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply 
rooted in our jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centu­
ries older than our Republic. Elementary considerations of fair­
ness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know 
what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled 
expectations should not be lightly disrupted. For that reason, the 
"principle that the legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be 
assessed under the law that existed when the conduct took place 
has timeless and universal human appeal. "123 
Furthermore, the Court stated that the designation of an effective 
date for a statute does not sufficiently show that Congress has 
thought out the potential unfairness that its retroactive effects 
would produce.124 In order to conclude that Congress intended for 
a statute to apply retroactively, the statutory language must be "so 
clear that it could sustain only one interpretation."125 In concluding 
that the IIRIRA did not have the requisite clarity, the Court held 
that section 212( c) remained available for criminal aliens whose 
plea agreements gave rise to their deportability and who would 
have been eligible for section 212( c) relief at the time of their plea 
under the law in effect.126 
St. Cyr opened the door to more applications for section 212( c) 
relief than would have been permitted by Soriano. 127 Based on St. 
Cyr, the DOJ published a rule on procedures for applying for sec­
tion 212( c) relief.128 This rule also allowed for special motions to 
121. Id. at 315. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 316 (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 
827, 855 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
124. Id. at 317. 
125. Id. at 316-17 (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 328 n.4 (1997)). 
126. Id. at 326. 
127. Id. 
128. Section 212(c) Relief for Aliens with Certain Criminal Convictions Before 
April 1, 1997,29 Fed. Reg. 57,826 (Sept. 28, 2004) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1003, 1212, 
and 1240). 
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reopen until April 26, 2005, in order to apply for section 212(c) re­
lief.129 Since this rule applied only to motions to reopen, a limited 
group of aliens who were placed in new removal proceedings would 
still be eligible to apply for section 212( c) relief.130 
II. NUNC PRO TUNC: FROM THE BASIC DOGrRINE TO ITS 
BROADER MEANING AND USE 
The following Part discusses the concept of nunc pro tunc. An 
overview of the basic doctrine is provided, followed by an examina­
tion of the scope of its use by the courts. More importantly, this 
Part also explains the use of nunc pro tunc in immigration, and re­
views several practical applications in this context. 
A. Elements of Nunc Pro Tunc: The Basic Doctrine 
Nunc pro tunc, literally meaning "now for then," is a common 
law concept that is invoked as an equitable remedy.l3l Indicative of 
its versatility, Black's Law Dictionary vaguely defines nunc pro 
tunc as "[h]aving retroactive legal effect through a court's inherent 
power."132 Nunc pro tunc is flexible, powerful, and may be used to 
remedy an assortment of problems. As explained by the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, the nature of the doctrine is "loose ... 
[and it is] used differently by different courts in different con­
texts."133 Its utility has been applied in various areas of law, includ­
ing family,134 property,13s criminal,136 bankruptcy,137 tax,13s and 
129. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326. 
130. STEEL, supra note 86, § 14:30. 
131. Referencing its discussion in Weil v. Markowitz, the Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit defined a nunc pro tunc order as "an equitable remedy traditionally used 
to apply a court's own order or judgment retroactively. Nunc pro tunc relief is 'availa­
ble in order to promote 'fairness to the parties', and 'as justice may require.'" Ethyl 
Corp. v. Browner, 67 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Weil v. Markowitz, 898 
F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1990». 
132. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1100 (8th ed. 2004). A more comprehensive and 
perhaps alternative definition is offered by the Free Legal Dictionary: 
[N]unc pro tunc (nuhnk proh tuhnk): adj. Latin for "now for then" this refers 
to changing back to an earlier date of an order, judgment, or filing of a docu· 
ment. Such a retroactive re·dating requires a court order which can be ob­
tained by a showing that the earlier date would have been legal, and there was 
error, accidental omission, or neglect which has caused a problem or inconve­
nience which can be cured. 
The Free Legal Dictionary, Legal Definition of Nunc Pro Tunc, http://legal-dictionary. 
thefreedictionary.com!nunc+pro+tunc (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
133. Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 2000). 
134. E.g., Perkins v. Perkins, 114 N.E. 713 (Mass. 1917). 
608 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:589 
immigration law.139 Nunc pro tunc remedies are most commonly 
given when an error has been committed by a court and should 
otherwise be retroactively corrected in order to avoid injustice.140 
When a nunc pro tunc order is granted, it is given legal force from 
the time of the original decision.141 
Quite often, the legal effect of a judgment may not be felt until 
a later point in time.142 If a significant error has occurred, it is 
likely to affect aspects of people's lives extraneous to the area of 
law in which the decision was rendered. For example, a judgment 
for the adoption of a child may affect that child's rights in a probate 
court administering her adoptive parent's estate.143 Another com­
135. E.g., Haray v. Haray, 265 N.W. 466 (Mich. 1936); Sovereign Bank v. Harper, 
674 A.2d 1085 (Pa. 1996) (granting a preliminary injunction requiring mortgagors to 
refrain from interfering with the sale of property nunc pro tunc to a time prior to the 
mortgagor's recording of revocation of deed). 
136. E.g., Ex parte Harris, 176 P.2d 508 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947) (using nunc pro 
tunc to allow petitioner, who was serving a prison sentence of fifteen years for a convic­
tion for armed robbery, to serve a twenty-five year sentence for a like offense concur­
rently rather than successively). 
137. E.g., In re Windsor Commc'ns Group, Inc., 68 B.R. 1007 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1986). For a discussion on bankruptcy courts' nunc pro tunc power, see In re Auto­
Train Corp., 810 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
138. In response to taxpayers attempting to reduce their federal tax liability or 
claim a refund by writing or stamping the words "nunc pro tunc" on their return, the 
Internal Revenue Service promulgated a ruling specifically prohibiting the practice, de­
claring it void of legal effect. Rev. Rul. 2006-17, 2006-1 C.B. 748, available at http:// 
www.irs.gov/irb/2006-15_IRB/arl0.html. 
139. See, e.g., In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1940); see also discussion infra 
Part II.C. 
140. Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 67 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Weil v. 
Markowitz, 898 F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1990)); 56 AM. JUR. 2D Motions, Rules, and 
Orders § 58 (2000) [hereinafter Motions, Rules, and Orders 1("A court has inherent 
power to issue an order nunc pro tunc to avoid injustice." (citations omitted»). 
141. Harris, 176 P.2d at 511 ("A nunc pro tunc entry of an order relates back and 
operates to make the order effective as of the date when it should have been entered."); 
West's Encyclopedia of Am. Law, Nunc Pro Tunc, http://www.enotes.com!wests-law­
encyclopedia/nunc-pro-tunc (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). 
142. Courts have held that, in order to be an effective remedy, the ability to make 
a nunc pro tunc correction "must continue until the error is called to the court's atten­
tion and corrected." In re Matter of Swandal, 587 P.2d 368, 372 (Mont. 1978). 
143. In Benjamin v. Celebrezze, the plaintiff sought benefits under the Social Se­
curity Act as an adopted child of the deceased. Benjamin v. Celebrezze, No. 26100, 
1965 WL 1438, at *1 (E.D. Mich. July 26, 1965). She had been placed in the custody of 
her adoptive parents, but her adoptive father, whose probate matter was before the 
court, died prior to receiving a proper adoption order. Id. As evidence of her status as 
the adopted child of the deceased, the plaintiff presented an "Order for Adoption­
Immediate Confirmation" entered by the judge nunc pro tunc to the date of the hearing 
at which custody was granted to the adoptive parents. [d. If the order was honored, the 
child would be eligible to receive social security benefits. However, the court declined 
to honor the nunc pro tunc order because such an order had not, in fact, been made at 
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mon scenario requiring a nunc pro tunc order arises when a final 
divorce decree has not been entered and the deficiency presents a 
problem for at least one of the parties. l44 
The design and rationale behind nunc pro tunc allow its use in 
many different areas of law.145 But despite its malleability, nunc 
pro tunc has several fixed characteristics. Nunc pro tunc is an appli­
cable remedy where there is an error or omission, usually commit­
ted by a court, that has resulted in inconvenience or injustice to the 
parties.146 When applied, nunc pro tunc should serve to correct the 
error or omission in a way that would restore justice to the affected 
parties.147 Since this is the mandate of nunc pro tunc, courts hold 
divergent views regarding its scope. Some courts restrict its use to 
only the correction of clerical errors, while others employ it to 
change the outcome of a prior judgment entirely. 
At the most widely accepted and basic level, nunc pro tunc is 
used to correct clerical errors or omissions made by a court.148 A 
the earlier date. Rather, the court found that the original order was for supervision of 
the child by the adopting parents, in observance of the statutory one-year waiting pe­
riod. Id. at *2. 
144. In Koester v. Estate of Koester, the district court rendered a decision in a 
contested divorce, ruling that land held by Don and Sherry Koester was community 
property of the parties. Koester v. Estate of Koester, 693 P.2d 569, 571 (Nev. 1985). 
That same afternoon, Sherry was killed in a car accident. The decree of divorce, how­
ever, was not filed until the following day. This meant that the Koesters were not offi­
cially divorced at the time of the accident and that Don, as Sherry's husband, would 
take the land by that right. Sherry's estate moved to enter the time of filing nunc pro 
tunc to a time prior to her death. Id. Because the decree was adjudicated during the 
lifetime of the parties and could have been rendered immediately but, for some reason, 
was not entered on the judgment record at the time, the court found that a nunc pro 
tunc entry was proper. Id. at 572-73; see also, e.g., McClintock v. McClintock, 138 P.3d 
513, 515 (Nev. 2006) (not realizing that she was still married to her first husband when 
she married her second husband, Kelly McClintock petitioned to have her final decree 
of divorce entered nunc pro tunc to the date before her second marriage). 
145. Other instances of nunc pro tunc usage include declarations by courts or 
governing bodies giving effect to actions or rules nunc pro tunc from a date in the past. 
See, e.g., U.S. Bankr. Court for the W. Dist. of Pa., Order of Reference of Bankruptcy 
Cases and Proceedings Nunc Pro Tunc (Oct. 16, 1984), available at http://www.pawb.us 
courts.gov/pdfs/OrderOfReference.pdf. 
146. Even under the narrow Massachusetts definition of nunc pro tunc, the court 
acknowledges the goal of the doctrine to "prevent a failure of justice." Perkins v. Per­
kins, 114 N.E. 713, 714 (Mass. 1917). 
147. Weil v. Markowitz, 898 F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1990). General require­
ments of a nunc pro tunc order include the date that it is made, reference to the original 
order, and a description of what is to be corrected. Some jurisdictions require the reo 
cord to reflect the facts authorizing the nunc pro tunc entry. Motions, Rules, and Or­
ders, supra note 140, § 58. 
148. See, e.g., Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1,5 (1st Cir. 2000) ("[A] clerical mistake in 
a judgment might be corrected nunc pro tunc when discovered later."); People v. Borja, 
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clerical error is defined as one that "does not result from judicial 
reasoning or deterrnination."149 Under this restricted use, the cor­
rection must be limited to reflect only what was originally intended 
by the court that entered the judgment; in other words, to make the 
record "speak the truth."150 It may not be used to alter or enlarge 
the judgment previously rendered, nor may it be used to supply an 
action omitted by the court.151 The courts that follow this strict def­
inition of nunc pro tunc not only limit its use to clerical errors or 
omissions, they also emphasize that nunc pro tunc may not be used 
115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) ("[A] nunc pro tunc order is generally 
limited to correcting clerical errors."); Interstate Printing Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 459 
N.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Neb. 1990) ("Clerical errors may be corrected by an order nunc 
pro tunc but judicial errors may not."); Dickson v. State, 988 S.W.2d 261, 263 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1998) ("A nunc pro tunc order may correct clerical errors in a judgment, but not 
judicial omissions or errors."). 
149. Dickson, 988 S.W.2d at 263; see, e.g., Koester, 693 P.2d at 573 n.2 ("Failure to 
file a final divorce decree then is a clerical omission."). In In re Estate of Swandal, the 
Supreme Court of Montana ordered a nunc pro tunc amendment to a decree of settle­
ment of final account and distribution of estate. The district court had erroneously 
included mineral rights in the decree that had been previously conveyed to a third 
party. The estate was reopened and the error corrected. In re Estate of Swandal, 587 
P.2d 368, 371 (Mont. 1978). 
150. Gunia v. Morton, 120 N.W.2d 371, 373 (Neb. 1963). In defining the Michi­
gan requirement for rendering relief nunc pro tunc, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
recites: "the office of a nunc pro tunc order is 'to speak what has been done, not to 
create'; or to supply an omission in the record of action really had but omitted through 
inadvertence or mistake or to enter an order which should have been made as a matter 
of course and as a legal duty." Haray v. Haray, 265 N.W. 466, 469 (Mich. 1936) (cita­
tions and emphasis omitted); see also Graber v. Iowa Dist. Court, 410 N.W.2d 224, 229 
(Iowa 1987) ("A nunc pro tunc order can be used only to correct obvious errors or to 
make an order conform to the judge's original intent."). 
151. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 1058, 1066 (Cal. 
1985) ("[A] nunc pro tunc order cannot declare that something was done which was not 
done."); Perkins v. Hayward, 31 N.E. 670, 672 (Ind. 1892) ("Its office is not to supply 
omitted action by the court, but to supply an omission in the record of action really had, 
but omitted through inadvertence or mistake." (emphasis added)); Interstate Printing 
Co., 459 N.W.2d at 522-23 ("It is proper for a court to make an entry nunc pro tunc so 
that its records will speak the truth."); Continental Oil Co. v. Harris, 333 N.W.2d 921, 
923 (Neb. 1983) ("It is not the function of an order nunc pro tunc to change or revise a 
judgment or order, or to set aside a judgment actually rendered, or to render an order 
different from the one actually rendered ...."); McClintock v. McClintock, 138 P.3d 
513,514 (Nev. 2006) ("[A] nunc pro tunc order can only reflect that which was actually 
done."); Hawks v. McCormack, 71 P.2d 724, 725 (Okla. 1937) ("[T]he true function of a 
nunc pro tunc order is to make the record speak the truth relative to the judgment or 
order. This is to make the record reflect the true judgment or order intended by the 
court at the time the original judgment or order was entered."); Wyo. Nat'l Bank of 
Gillette v. Davis, 770 P.2d 215, 217 (Wyo. 1989) (" '[N]unc pro tunc is limited to cases 
where it is necessary to make the judgment speak the truth, and cannot be used to 
change the judgment.'" (quoting Arnold v. State, 306 P.2d 368, 374 (Wyo. 1957))); see 
also Motions, Rules, and Orders, supra note 140, § 58. 
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to correct judicial errors.152 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that "a defect in a judgment, order or decree which ex­
pressed exactly the intention of the court at the time when it was 
made cannot be remedied by a nunc pro tunc entry."153 Thus, even 
if a judgment was later found to be erroneous, it would fall outside 
the scope of a nunc pro tunc correction. 
Aside from the limitation of nunc pro tunc to correct only cler­
ical errors to reflect the original intent of the court, there are cer­
tain instances where such discretion is simply not available.154 An 
example of one such instance concerns the mandatory fees set by 
the legislature, which must be included with court document fil­
ings.155 If a document is not accompanied by the appropriate fee, a 
court will not be willing to invoke nunc pro tunc to treat the docu­
ment as filed at a previous date after the fee is paid. In certain 
circumstances, where precluded by either the express language of a 
statute or intent of the legislature, nunc pro tunc may not be 
invoked.156 
152. See, e.g., Fed. Land Bank of Omaha v. Dunkelberger, 499 N.W.2d 305, 308­
09 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) ("Such an order is not for the purpose of correcting judicial 
thinking, a judicial conclusion, or mistake of law."); Interstate Printing Co., 459 N.W.2d 
at 523; Ricketts v. Cont'! Nat'! Bank, 101 N.W.2d 153, 157 (Neb. 1960) ("[T]he purpose 
of an order nunc pro tunc is not to correct, change, or modify action previously taken 
by the court."). 
153. Perkins v. Perkins, 114 N.E. 713, 714 (Mass. 1917). 
154. Duran v. St. Luke's Hosp., 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1,3-4 (2003). 
155. Take, for example, the case of Celina Duran. Id. Duran attempted to file a 
complaint for medical malpractice against St. Luke's Hospital for allegedly causing the 
death of her infant. Id. at 1. Two days before the expiration of the statute of limita­
tions, Duran's attorney sent the complaint, summons, and a check for $203 to the filing 
clerk. Id. at 1-2. The clerk received the documents, but did not file them because the 
check was $3 short of the required $206 filing fee. By the time the situation was made 
known to Duran's attorney, the statute of limitations had expired. !d. at 2. Duran then 
filed a petition for a nunc pro tunc order to declare the complaint filed on the date that 
the clerk received it. A sympathetic trial court, describing the situation as a "horror 
story" due to the "very, very minimal" shortage of $3 from meeting the filing fee, was 
forced to dismiss the petition for nunc pro tunc relief because clerks are statutorily 
mandated to refrain from filing any documents or pleadings if the requisite fees are not 
paid. Id. at 3. The court relied on a string of decisions upholding the requirement that 
filing fees be paid in advance, as a condition precedent to the performance of filing by 
the clerks. It also pointed to the legislature's statutory language in support of advanced 
payment of the "mandatory" filing fees. Id. 
156. In Powell v. Blevins, the court declined to enter a nunc pro tunc order that 
would deem a document to be timely filed when it reached the clerk five days after the 
expiration of the filing period. The court noted that, to enter an order nunc pro tunc, it 
"cannot do more than supply a record of something that was actually done at the time 
to which it is retroactive." Powell v. Blevins, 365 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Ky. 1963). Because 
there was no earlier action to which the filing could relate back, a nunc pro tunc order 
would be inappropriate. . 
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Other instances where courts have declined to order a nunc 
pro tunc remedy have been when the error or delay was not caused 
by the court but by the plaintiff or petitioner himself. Because the 
application of nunc pro tunc is discretionary, where the error is not 
attributable to the court, it is less inclined to give relief. The Duran 
court alluded to this notion in stating that when "evaluating the 
timeliness of a petition ... 'it is the filer's actions that are scruti­
nized.' "157 Other c.ourts have precluded nunc pro tunc relief where 
the delay is caused by the laches of the parties.158 Thus, eligibility 
for nunc pro tunc relief is also dependent on to whom the error is 
attributable. 
B. Expanding the Scope of Nunc Pro Tunc 
In contrast to the narrow application of nunc pro tunc, some 
courts have expanded the scope of nunc pro tunc relief beyond 
mere clerical corrections. Because the availability of nunc pro tunc 
is premised on ensuring a fair and just judgment, courts have also. 
applied nunc pro tunc to change the outcome of a judgment or the 
original intent of the court. The paradigm case that applies nunc 
pro tunc to ensure a fair result is Mitchell v. Overman.159 In Mitch­
ell, Conrad Stutzman brought a suit against Robert Mitchell and 
several others on July 26, 1866.160 The matter was taken under ad­
visement by the district court at its October Term in 1868.161 Unbe­
knownst to the defendants, Stutzman died on November 10, 1869, 
while the case was still under advisement.162 No mention of his 
death was entered in the record, although his attorney continued to 
represent his interests.163 When the district court finally rendered a 
judgment in Stutzman's favor on November 10, 1872, Mitchell re­
157. Duran, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 3 (quoting United Farm Workers of Am. v. Agric. 
Labor Relations Bd., 694 P.2d 138, 142 (Cal. 1985)). 
158. Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 65 (1881). Laches is the "[u]nreasonable 
delay in pursuing a right or claim-almost always an equitable one-in a way that 
prejudices the party against whom relief is sought." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 132, at 891; see, e.g., Vernon v. Att'y Gen., 181 F. App'x 201, 203 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(failure of petitioner to pursue erroneously closed naturalization proceedings during 
the years of 1986 to 2003 compelled the court to deem him ineligible for nunc pro tunc 
relief). 
159. Mitchell, 103 U.S. at 62. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 63. 
162. Id. 
163. [d. Overman was Stutzman's administrator who commenced the action to 
recover against Mitchell. Id. 
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sisted it on the ground that it was void because it was rendered after 
Stutzman had died. l64 
Attributing the delay in rendering the judgment to the lower 
court, the Supreme Court concluded that the legal maxim actus cu­
riae neminem gravabit, meaning "[a]n act of the court will prejudice 
no one,"165 dictated that a nunc pro tunc order should be given. For 
the "administration of justice," the Court found a duty to ensure 
that the parties involved did not unduly suffer because of the delay 
caused by the district court.166 The Court reasoned that because 
Stutzman was alive and entitled to recovery when he submitted his 
claim, he continued to be entitled to recovery through its final dis­
position.167 Consequently, the Court entered a nunc pro tunc order 
to treat the judgment for Stutzman as if it had been rendered at a 
time prior to his death.168 
The nunc pro tunc doctrine has also been expanded to ensure a 
just result by encompassing correction of errors by government 
agencies.169 In particular, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
has expressly applied nunc pro tunc "where necessary to put the 
victim of agency error 'in the ... position it would have occupied 
but for the error."'170 For example, in Ethyl Corp. v. Browner,171 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied the corpora­
tion a waiver that would permit the sale of fuel containing a certain 
additive.1n Without the waiver, Ethyl Corporation would lose its 
registration to use the additive, which meant it would have to un­
dergo what would have amounted to years of testing under newly 
adopted reguiationsY3 When the court held that the EPA unlaw­
fully withheld the waiver, it granted the waiver nunc pro tunc to the 
164. Id. 
165. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 132, at 1704. 
166. Mitchell, 103 U.S. at 65 ("[U]pon the maxim actus curite neminem 
gravabit,-which has been well said to be founded in right and good sense, and to af­
ford a safe and certain guide for the administration of justice,-it is the duty of the 
court to see that the parties shall not suffer by the delay."). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Sierra Club v. Whitman, 285 F.3d 63, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("On several occa­
sions, this court has directed agencies to readjudicate matters retroactive to the date of 
the initial determination ...."). 
170. Ethyl Corp. v. Browner, 67 F.3d 941, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Delta 
Data Sys. Corp. v. Webster, 744 F.2d 197, 206-07 (D.C. Cir. 1984». 
171. Id. at 941. 
172. Id. at 942. 
173. Id. 
614 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:589 
original date it should have been granted,174 By awarding a waiver 
nunc pro tunc, the Ethyl Corp. court did not limit its scope to the 
correction of simple clerical errors, but actually reversed the EPA's 
decision to deny the waiver.175 
The flexibility of nunc pro tunc has resulted in divergent views 
among state courts and federal courts alike. Parties who desire a 
nunc pro tunc remedy are, therefore, required to consider the law 
governing the applicability of nunc pro tunc in their respective juris­
dictions. In addition, parties should take into account the nature of 
their claim-whether it is a state law or federal claim, whether 
there is a government agency involved, and also what area of law 
the subject matter of their claim involves. The same principle of 
nunc pro tunc is not applied uniformly across disciplines and largely 
depends on the unique issues presented by each system. The doc­
trine of nunc pro tunc has been extensively used to address the par­
ticular challenges presented in the area of immigration. 
C. Nunc Pro Tunc in Immigration 
1. The Broader Scope of Nunc Pro Tunc in Immigration 
Nunc pro tunc has a "long and distinguished history" in immi­
gration law.176 Its availability recognizes the potentially harsh con­
sequences that can result from the mechanical application of 
immigration law and the importance of mitigating these effects.177 
The principles behind the doctrine hold true in the immigration 
context. To further the interests of justice to the petitioner, nunc 
pro tunc is available to equitably remedy an error or omission com­
mitted by the agency or court and has a legal effect retroactive to 
the date of the original order. Nunc pro tunc has been applied 
broadly in matters concerning immigration and is not limited to the 
correction of clerical errors or to compliance with the original order 
by the agency,17s Within immigration law, the use of nunc pro tunc 
enjoys a considerable range, including filing of timely applica­
174. ld. at 945. 
175. ld. 
176. Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 308 (2d Cir. 2004). 
177. ld. 
178. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672, 678 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The BIA 
... has a long history of employing nunc pro tunc to backdate proceedings and orders 
where the error was not clerical or where there was no error at all." (citing Edwards, 
393 F.3d at 308)). 
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tions,179 correcting records of entry,180 and adjudicating deportation 
hearings due to previous violations of procedural due process.18l 
In the context of immigration, nunc pro tunc relief is granted in 
instances "limited to those in which the grant would effect a com­
plete disposition of the case."182 There are two situations where an 
immigration judge or the BIA has the power to grant nunc pro tunc 
relief in deportation decisions. The first of these circumstances is 
where the only ground of deportability would be extinguished.183 
The second is where an alien would be granted an adjustment of 
status, which would operate in conjunction with the grant of any 
appropriate waivers from deportation.t84 The discretion and au­
thority to grant nunc pro tunc relief are conferred upon the Attor­
ney General by law185 and should be exercised "as is appropriate 
and necessary for the disposition of the case."186 
2. Practical Applications of Nunc Pro Tunc in Immigration 
a. Timely filing of applications 
A common use of a nunc pro tunc order in the immigration 
context is the granting of a request to file a late application on time 
or an originally incorrectly filed application correctly.187 Although 
not all circumstances allow for nunc pro tunc as an option, it may be 
a valuable tool in soliciting forgiveness for an inadvertent lapse in 
legal status from immigration officials. When the petitioners have 
179. See, e.g., Murthy Law Firm, Nunc Pro Tunc H1B and H-4 Cases Approved 
(Sept. 8, 2006), http://www.murthy.com/news/n_nunpro.html. 
180. See, e.g., In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1940); see also discussion infra 
Part II.C.2.b. 
181. See, e.g., Snajder v. INS, 29 F.3d 1203 (7th Cir. 1994); Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 
662 (7th Cir. 1993); see also discussion infra Part 11.C.2.c. 
182. In re Garcia·Linares, 21 I. & N. Dec. 254, 257 (B.I.A. 1996); see, e.g., In re 
T-, 61. & N. Dec. 410 (B.I.A. 1954). In In re T-, the alien was charged with perjury 
and was deemed deportable for improper entry into the United States after being em­
ployed overseas as a civilian with the Lockheed Corporation serving the U.S. Army 
from 1943 to 1944. He had reentered, however, with a passport he had perjured himself 
to obtain. Desiring to serve overseas, he had claimed to be a U.S. citizen to obtain the 
passport; in reality, he had been admitted for permanent residency in 1911 when he was 
a year old. Because of his good moral character and allegiance to the United States, the 
BIA granted nunc pro tunc relief; in effect, waiving the grounds for his inadmissibility 
which served as the basis of the charges for which he was deportable and, thus, termi­
nating the alien's immigration proceedings. /d. 
183. Garcia-Linares, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 254. 
184. Id.; see e.g., In re Ducret, 15 I. & N. Dec. 620 (B.I.A. 1976). 
185. INA § 212(c), 8 U.S.c. § 1182(c) (2000). 
186. In re Vrettakos, 14 I. & N. Dec. 593, 597 (B.LA. 1974). 
187. Murthy Law Firm, supra note 179. 
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valid proof of inadvertence and, usually, some humanitarian reason 
for receiving relief, they may be allowed to apply nunc pro tunc for 
legal status,188 
b. To correct records of entry 
Nunc pro tunc is especially appropriate as a remedy in deporta­
tion proceedings, given the serious consequences of a deportation 
order and the tremendously unfair result if the order was made in 
error.189 If an alien is deportable because of a defect in his record 
of entry, nunc pro tunc may be used to correct it,190 In fact, the first 
reported case by the INS was one allowing such nunc pro tunc re­
lief. The petitioner in In re L- was a lawful permanent resident of 
the United States, having originally entered the country in 1909.191 
In 1924, the petitioner pled guilty to larceny for taking a co­
worker's watch from a shelf at his place of employment after some 
drinking.192 Notwithstanding the conviction, he was found to be of 
"good moral character," and was issued a certificate of registry 
which was required for all aliens by the Registry Act of 1929.193 In 
June of 1939, he made a trip to Yugoslavia to visit his seriously ill 
sister and returned to the United States in August without any inci­
dent at the border.194 However, three and a half months after his 
return, deportation proceedings were instituted against the peti­
tioner because he had not been properly inspected and admitted as 
an alien who had been convicted of larceny,195 
188. Id. An example of such inadvertence combined with a humanitarian reason 
would be a situation in which a husband is working in the United States on a HIB 
specialty occupation visa, and his pregnant wife is in H4 status (as the spouse of one in 
the United States on a HIB visa holder). In the event that the husband changes jobs, 
his company obtains an extension of his HIB approval. However, the company does 
not inform the couple that the wife's status also requires extension. The couple assumes 
that since the husband's status is in good standing, so is the wife's. Additionally, the 
wife, after giving birth, is unconcerned with checking her immigration status. Unknown 
to the couple, her status expires. They stumble across information that reveals the mis­
take, but find that it would be impractical for the wife and newborn to travel and, in 
addition, be apart from the husband. The wife is able to make a nunc pro tunc applica­
tion for H4 status approval. Id. 
189. Justice Brandeis once observed that deportation "may result also in loss of 
both property and life; or all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 
U.S. 276, 284 (1922). 
190. IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN'S IMMIGRATION SOURCEBOOK 841 (10th ed. 
2006). 
191. In re L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. 1, 1 (B.I.A. 1940). 
192. Id. at 2. 
193. Id. at 4. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
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At the time, the law allowed a waiver of exclusion at the dis­
cretion of the Attorney General.196 The petitioner, however, was in 
deportation proceedings, not exclusion proceedings, because he had 
already been ?.dmitted to the country.197 Finding that the petitioner 
was deserving of the waiver, the Attorney General concluded that it 
would be a "capricious and whimsical" operation of the immigra­
tion laws to require him to leave the country so that he could apply 
for the waiver of exclusion upon reentry.198 For this reason, the 
Attorney General allowed a nunc pro tunc correction to the peti­
tioner's record of entry in 1939.199 
Since 1940, when In re L- was decided, the immigration laws 
have undergone significant changes. The grounds for deportation 
increased dramatically in the latter half of the twentieth century.200 
Because nunc pro tunc gives an order retroactive effect, it is an im­
portant form of relief from changes to the laws that have unfavora­
ble consequences for aliens. 
c. To remedy violations of due process 
It is well established that aliens in deportation proceedings are 
entitled to due process of law.201 The procedural requirements that 
deportation proceedings should observe include: (1) notice of the 
charges and notice of the time and place of the proceedings; (2) 
representation by an attorney; (3) "the reasonable opportunity to 
examine the evidence, present witnesses, and cross-examine ad­
verse witnesses;" and (4) "a decision based on reasonable, substan­
tial, and probative evidence.''202 Generally, if procedural errors 
deny an alien a hearing in compliance with due process, the remedy 
is to hold a new hearing.203 In the event that circumstances have 
changed so that an alien's rights are diminished, and he is no longer 
eligible for certain types of relief, a nunc pro tunc order would 
serve to protect the alien's rights to the extent that they existed at 
the time of the original hearing.204 
196. Id. at 5; see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text. 
197. L-, 1 I. & N. Dec. at 5-6. 
198. Id. at 5. 
199. Id. at 6. 
200. See supra Part I.A.2. 
201. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
202. Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 1993) (referencing the statutory 
procedural requirements set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b». 
203. Id. 
204. See id. 
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One instance in which a court issued a nunc pro tunc order to 
remedy a violation of due process in a deportation proceeding is 
Batanic v. INS.20S Ivan Batanic, a lawful permanent resident, faced 
deportation on the basis of a conviction for delivery of a controlled 
substance.206 Batanic's attorney failed to appear at his deportation 
hearing.207 Despite the fact that the INS's attorney stated that he 
had no objection to an adjournment, the immigration judge decided 
to proceed with the hearing and, thereafter, found Batanic deport­
able.20s The BIA reversed the immigration judge's order of depor­
tation on the basis that Batanic's right to counsel had been 
infringed upon when the immigration judge continued with the 
hearing without his attorney present.209 The proceedings were re­
manded to an immigration judge.210 
Batanic, through counsel, moved to file an application for asy­
lum. However, in the intervening time between the BIA's reversal 
and the remanded proceedings, amendments to the immigration 
laws had taken effect.211 Under these amendments, an alien con­
victed of an aggravated felony was ineligible for asylum.212 
Batanic's motion to file for asylum was denied by the immigration 
judge because, under the new law, he was statutorily ineligible.213 
The BIA affirmed, denying Batanic's appea1.214 In reviewing the 
BIA's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit deter­
mined that the deprivation of Batanic's right to counsel equated to 
a deprivation of his right to apply for asylum, and that the BIA's 
position was inconsistent with the language of the statute.21S Con­
sequently, the court of appeals reversed the BIA's decision and or­
dered it to allow Batanic to file his application for asylum nunc pro 
tunc.216 
Nunc pro tunc relief is readily given to aliens whose due pro­
cess rights are violated during the course of a deportation proceed­
205. Id. at 662. 
206. Id. at 663. The controlled substance violation constituted an aggravated fel­
ony, thereby rendering Batanic deportable. 
207. Id. 




212. Id. at 664 n.3. 
213. Id. at 664. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 667-68. 
216. Id. at 668. 
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ing.217 This circumstance may be the easiest in which to justify this 
type of relief. The INS is amenable to the use of nunc pro tunc 
when denial of relief from deportation rises to the level of a due 
process violation.218 A problem arises, however, when the denial of 
relief falls short of being a violation of due process. In such a sce­
nario, the INS has argued that nunc pro tunc is not an available 
remedy and should be limited to situations in which due process has 
not been properly given.219 This, however, does not comport with 
the INS's own jurisprudence or practice.220 As this Note will 
demonstrate, nunc pro tunc is an available remedy to those whose 
section 212( c) petitions were wrongfully denied. 
III. THE FIRST, SECOND, AND FIFTH CIRCUIT VIEWS ON 

NUNC PRO TUNC ADJUDICATION OF 

SECTION 212(c) WAIVERS 

This Part discusses the three cases that serve as the basis of the 
circuit split concerning the issue of whether a criminal alien should 
be allowed to have an application for section 212(c) relief adjudi­
cated nunc pro tunc where the BIA relied on an erroneous decision 
in originally denying the application. The Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit was the first to decide the issue in Edwards v. 
INS.22I Seven months later, the Court of Appeals for the First Cir­
cuit rendered its opinion on the issue in Fernandes Pereira v. Gon­
zales .222 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was the latest to 
weigh in on the controversy, with its decision in Romero-Rodriguez 
v. Gonzales.223 
The basic fact pattern which gives rise to the issue in this Note 
is as follows. An alien is admitted to the United States as a lawful 
permanent resident and remains domiciled in the country for at 
least seven years. Before the AEDPA and IIRIRA are enacted, the 
alien commits an act that is considered an aggravated felony and, 
after entering a guilty plea, is convicted of the crime. The INS initi­
ates deportation proceedings against the alien, who is serving time 
in prison for the conviction. Meanwhile, the AEDPA and IIRIRA 
217. See, e.g., id.; Snajder v. INS, 29 F.3d 1203 (7th Cir. 1994). 
218. Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 310-11 (2d Cir. 2004). 
219. See id. at 311. 
220. See supra Part II.C. 
221. Edwards, 393 F.3d 299. 
222. Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), reh'g denied en 
bane, 446 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2006). 
223. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2007). 
620 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:589 
are enacted into law, repealing section 212(c). When the alien ap­
pears before an immigration judge at a deportation hearing, the 
judge issues an order of deportation on the basis of the alien's ag­
gravated felony conviction. The alien's appeal to the BIA and ap­
plication for section 212( c) relief is denied because, according to the 
BIA's decision in In re Soriano, the waiver is no longer available to 
any alien convicted of an aggravated felony, even if the conviction 
was entered prior to the enactment of the AEDPA and IIRIRA. 
The BIA's decision in Soriano, however, is later overturned by 
the court of appeals and, consequently, the alien is successful in 
moving the BIA to reopen the alien's deportation hearings. When 
the alien's case is remanded to an immigration judge, the applica­
tion for section 212( c) relief is denied once again. This time, the 
application is denied because, by the time of the second hearing, 
the alien has served in excess of five years in prison, thereby ren­
dering the alien statutorily ineligible for a section 212( c) waiver. 
The BrA affirms the immigration judge's decision and the alien pe­
titions for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court. 
A. The Second Circuit 
Edwards v. INS consolidated appeals from two decisions: Fal­
coni v. INS224 and Edwards v. INS.225 In Falconi, the district court 
found that but for the immigration judge and BIA's erroneous ret­
roactive application of the AEDPA, Falconi would have been eligi­
ble to apply for section 212( c) relief at the time of her original 
hearing.226 This was because, at that time, she had served less than 
five years in prison.227 The court remanded the case to the INS 
with instructions to evaluate Falconi's section 212( c) application on 
its merits.228 
Edwards differs slightly from the general fact pattern outlined 
above. In this case, the alien's original deportation hearing before 
an immigration judge occurred in 1995, prior to the passage of the 
AEDPA and IIRIRA.229 The immigration judge found Edwards to 
be deportable, but granted his application for a section 212( c) 
224. Falconi v. INS, 240 F. Supp. 2d 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), affd sub nom., Ed­
wards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2004). 
225. Edwards v. INS, No. 02-CV-3309, 2003 WL 1786483 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 
2003), rev'd, 393 F.3d 299. 
226. Falconi, 240 F. Supp. 2d at 218. 
227. Id. 
228. Id. 
229. Edwards, 393 F.3d at 304. 
621 200S] NUNC PRO TUNC ADJUDICATION OF SECTION 212(c) 
waiver because of the "outstanding equities" in his favor.23o By the 
time the INS appealed, the AEDPA and IIRIRA were in effect, 
and the BIA revoked the section 212( c) waiver because, based on 
Soriano, the waiver was no longer available to Edwards.231 His 
subsequent habeas petition was assigned to a district court judge 
who denied it, finding that the time Edwards served in prison after 
the original BIA decision counted towards the five-year bar.232 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit accepted appeals 
by both the INS (in the case of Falconi) and Edwards. The petition­
ers, Falconi and Edwards, raised two claims: (1) that eligibility for 
section 212(c) relief should be evaluated in relation to the alien's 
"status as of the time of the entry of an administratively final order 
of deportation";233 and (2) that, "in the exercise of its equitable 
powers," the court should afford the petitioners nunc pro tunc re­
lief.234 The court declined to address the merits of the petitioner's 
first claim because, ultimately, it agreed with their second 
contention.235 
In examining the statutory issue of when an alien's eligibility 
for section 212( c) should be determined, the court opined that if it 
were to study the BIA's section 212(c) jurisprudence, it could very 
well find that the time for determining whether the five-year bar 
had been reached should be when the "alien's final order of depor­
tation was entered."236 Furthermore, the court stated that INS reg­
ulations237 could be read to support this position.238 The court 
protested the "forceful" contention by the INS that time served in 
prison counts towards the five-year bar and continues to accrue in­
definitely.239 To illustrate its contention, the court even pointed to 
a decision holding that the erroneous denial of an opportunity to 
apply for a section 212(c) waiver is tantamount to a violation of due 
process.240 In declining to discuss the petitioners' first contention 
that, as a matter of statutory construction, the proper date for de­
230. [d. 
231. Id. 
232. [d. at 305. 
233. [d. at 306-07. 
234. [d. at 307. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. See discussion infra Part V.A. 

23S. Edwards, 393 F.3d at 307. 

239. Id. at 30S (citing United States v. Copeland, 376 F.3d 61, 70-71 (2d Cir. 
2004». 
240. Id. 
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termining whether an alien is eligible for section 212( c) relief is the 
date of the final deportation order, the court circumvented the need 
to discuss whether Chevron deference241 should be afforded to the 
agency.242 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the 
doctrine of nunc pro tunc has been long-used in the field of immi­
gration law.243 The court further noted that its use has not been 
limited to the administrative bodies that execute immigration laws, 
but also has been applied by courts in order to return aliens to the 
position they would have been in but for an error in their immigra­
tion proceedings.244 Thus, the court found that "it is ... beyond 
question that an award of nunc pro tunc may, in an appropriate 
circumstance, be granted as a means of rectifying error in immigra­
tion proceedings," and is not limited to correction of only inadver­
tent clerical errors.245 Only when an award of such equitable relief 
would contravene the express intent of Congress would it be imper­
missible.246 Finding that Congress did not expressly preclude the 
use of nunc pro tunc relief in this particular instance, the court con­
cluded that it was permitted to award section 212( c) relief nunc pro 
tunc.247 
Since the court was not statutorily barred from employing a 
nunc pro tunc remedy, it could award such relief "as justice may 
require."248 Because the consequence of denying a section 212(c) 
waiver was deportation for the alien, the court held that the peti­
tioners needed only demonstrate that they were wrongfully denied 
the opportunity the apply for section 212( c) relief in order to be 
awarded a nunc pro tunc remedy.249 Accordingly, the Second Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision in Fal­
coni, remanding her case to the EOIR for a hearing on the merits 
of her section 212( c) application. Because Edwards was originally 
granted a section 212(c) waiver, his waiver was reinstated.250 
241. Chevron deference is "the deference that is afforded to an agency's interpre­
tation of a statute that it is charged with administering." Id. at 308 n.ll (citing Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984». 
242. Id. at 308. 
243. Id. 
244. /d. at 308-09. 
245. Id. at 309 (citation omitted). 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 310. 
248. Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62,65 (1882». 
249. Id. at 312. 
250. Id. 
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B. The First Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied on its decision 
in Gomes v. Ashcroft251 in deciding Fernandes Pereira v. Gonza­
les ,252 determining that the time served in prison, even after a le­
gally erroneous denial of section 212(c) relief, should count towards 
the five-year bar.253 It came to this conclusion despite the fact that 
Gomes had served over five years in prison when the BIA issued its 
final order of removal whereas the petitioner, Fernandes Pereira, 
had not.254 The court affirmed the BIA's finding that Fernandes 
Pereira was statutorily ineligible for the waiver at the time of his 
reopened deportation proceedings because he had served more 
than five years in prison by that time.255 
The court rejected Fernandes Pereira's argument that the re­
sult of the decision was unfair to the point of being unconstitutional 
and concluded that Congress had no obligation to shelter aliens 
who committed felonies.256 It was of no consequence, in the court's 
opinion, that Fernandes Pereira was once eligible for relief because 
he was now, according to the court's literal reading of the statutory 
language, simply ineligible to apply.257 The court found that deter­
mining Fernandes Pereira's eligibility for the section 212(c) waiver 
at the time of his second deportation hearing was not a violation of 
the Due Process Clause.258 
In deciding whether nunc pro tunc is appropriate, the court de­
clined to follow the analysis by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit.259 Instead, the court applied the Massachusetts definition 
of the nunc pro tunc doctrine, which states that "nunc pro tunc au­
thority may only be used to correct inadvertent or clerical errors, 
and not to remedy 'a defect in a judgment, order, or decree which 
expressed exactly the intention of the [agency] at the time when it 
was made."'26o Consequently, the court determined that because 
251. Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 2002); see infra notes 340, 345. 
252. Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2005), reh'g denied en 
bane, 436 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2006). 
253. Id. at 44. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 45. 
256. Id. at 46. 
257. Id. at 45-46. 
258. Id. at 47-48. 
259. Id. at 47. 
260. Id. (quoting Fierro v. Reno, 217 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000». 
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the legal interpretation made by the BIA was in good faith it could 
not be altered by employing the doctrine of nunc pro tunc.261 
Fernandes Pereira subsequently petitioned for a rehearing, 
which was denied en banc.262 Circuit Judge Lipez offered a dissent­
ing opinion.263 In his view, an en bane review would have been 
appropriate for two reasons: (1) the panel's finding that nunc pro 
tunc was not an available remedy improperly limited the availabil­
ity of equitable relief for aliens and (2) the panel took the wrong 
approach in its due process analysis.264 Judge Lipez expressed his 
concern over the panel's conclusory reasoning that because Con­
gress limited relief to aliens with criminal records, it also intended 
to "preclude the agency from exercising the equitable relief that it 
has used to correct errors and further the interests of justice under 
extraordinary circumstances ...."265 While Judge Lipez agreed 
with the panel's ultimate conclusion on the issue of due process, he 
found serious flaws with the panel's analysis.266 Instead of focusing 
on the "good faith" of the agency, Judge Lipez asserted that the 
focus should have been on the consequences to the petitioner.267 
However, because Fernandes Pereira failed to demonstrate a rea­
sonable likelihood that he would have been granted a section 212( c) 
waiver had he been permitted to apply, Judge Lipez found that 
there was not a sufficient showing of fundamental unfairness in his 
immigration proceedings.268 
C. The Fifth Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Romero-Rodri­
guez v. Gonzales269 reviewed the BIA's interpretation of section 
212(c) under a Chevron analysis.270 In the first step of the Chevron 
analysis, the court determined that Congress had not directly spo­
ken to the particular question at issue.271 The court concluded that 
the language of former section 212( c) was ambiguous because it did 
not consider the possibility that an alien could be in prison at the 
261. Id. 
262. Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 11, 11 (1st Cir. 2006). 
263. Id. (Lipez, J., dissenting). 
264. Id. at 13. 
265. Id. at 14. 
266. Id. at 17. 
267. Id. at 19. 
268. Id. at 18-19. 
269. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2007). 
270. Id. at 675. 
271. Id. 
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time eligibility for the waiver was determined. Consequently, the 
date for determining eligibility was unclear: was it the initial denial 
or the subsequent denial?272 
Because it found section 212( c) to be ambiguous, the court 
proceeded to the second step of the Chevron analysis. It ascer­
tained whether the BIA's interpretation of section 212(c)-that the 
relevant date for determining eligibility for the waiver is the date of 
denial following the reopening of the case-was "based on a per­
missible construction of the statute."273 While it expressed sympa­
thy for the alien's plight, the court found that there was nothing in 
the statutory framework that contradicted the BIA's construction 
of section 212(c).274 Thus, pursuant to Chevron, the court deferred 
to the BIA's application of section 212( c ).275 
The court then proceeded to consider Romero-Rodriguez's pe­
tition for nunc pro tunc relief.276 The crux of the court's decision 
was its distinction between the nunc pro tunc power of the BIA and 
its own nunc pro tunc power as a separate adjudicatory body.277 
The court's equitable nunc pro tunc power was, by the Fifth Cir­
cuit's definition, limited to correcting clerical or other record-keep­
ing errors,278 while the BIA had developed a "history of employing 
272. Id. at 676. 
273. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 843 (1984), and citing Heaven v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 167, 175 (5th Cir. 2006)). 
274. Id. at 676-77. 
275. Id. at 677. A court may choose not to give deference to an agency's interpre­
tation of a statute where its interpretation is inconsistent. Batanic v. INS, 12 F.3d 662, 
666 (7th Cir. 1993). Because there were two sets of deportation hearings in this circum­
stance, the first hearing when the waiver was wrongfully denied and the second after a 
successful petition to reopen the hearings, the problem becomes even more complex. 
The language of the statute is certainly ambiguous on this point, as it does not take into 
account the possibility of a second set of deportation hearings. See Romero-Rodriguez, 
480 F.3d at 676. Under Chevron, the Batanic court required the agency's interpreta­
tion to be "reasonable" (as opposed to merely "permissible"), stating that "'[d]eference 
does not mean acquiescence. As in other contexts in which we defer to an administra­
tive interpretation of a statute, we do so ... only if the administrative interpretation is 
reasonable.'" Batanic, 12 F.3d at 665-66 (quoting Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 
502 U.S. 491, 508 (1992) (emphasis added)). The reasonableness of the BIA's evalua­
tion of application of the section 212(c) at the time of the second set of hearings is 
debatable. Five years is a relatively short time span. Given that the petitioners who are 
in a position to open their proceedings must have been convicted of an aggravated 
felony prior to the passage of the 1996 acts, it is almost a certainty that they will have 
served over five years in prison at the time of their reopened hearings. It is doubtful 
that the BIA reasonably believed that reopening the hearing would change the outcome 
of the case if eligibility for the waiver is determined at the time of the second hearing. 
276. Romero-Rodriguez, 488 F.3d at 677. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. 
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nunc pro tunc to backdate proceedings and orders where the error 
was not clerical or where there was no error at a1L"279 Because the 
court determined that its nunc pro tunc power was limited to cor­
rection of clerical errors, even in the immigration context, the court 
declined to side with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
exercised its authority to require the BIA to consider section 212( c) 
petitions nunc pro tunc.280 On this point, the Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit agreed with that of the First Circuit.281 
Unlike the First Circuit, however, the court remanded the case 
to the BIA to address the question of whether the BIA's nunc pro 
tunc authority was available.282 In doing so, the court made it clear 
that, should the BIA find that a nunc pro tunc remedy was available 
in this circumstance, it would have the effect of reinstating the peti­
tioner's eligibility for a section 212(c) waiver.283 In this respect, the 
court agreed with the determination made by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit-that the effect of a nunc pro tunc remedy 
would be to provide the alien with an opportunity to have his sec­
tion 212( c) petition adjudicated on its merits. 
IV. ALLOWING NUNC PRO TUNC RELIEF FOR CRIMINAL ALIENS 

WRONGFULLY DENIED A SECTION 212(c) HEARING 

BASED ON SORIANO 

This next Part demonstrates that the doctrine of nunc pro tunc 
is an available and proper remedy for individuals whose petitions 
for section 212( c) relief were originally denied in reliance on Sori­
ano. First, this Part establishes that the doctrine of nunc pro tunc 
remains available for use in conjunction with section 212( c) in the 
absence of an express prohibition by Congress. Second, it discusses 
why the application of nunc pro tunc in these particular cases is 
consistent with its accepted and common use in immigration law. 
Finally, this Part argues that nunc pro tunc is especially designed to 
correct errors, such as the one affecting the individuals in these 
cases, and that principles of equity dictate that nunc pro tunc be 
granted as a remedy. 
279. Id. at 678 (citing Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 308 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
280. [d. at 678-79. 
281. [d. 
282. [d. at 679. 
283. [d. 
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A. 	 The Persistence of Nunc Pro Tunc Application of 
Section 212(c) 
The availability of section 212( c) discretionary waivers nunc 
pro tunc continues to exist in the absence of express congressional 
intent to revoke such application of the waiver.284 Since the enact­
ment of the first rendition of the discretionary waiver in the Immi­
gration Act of 1917,285 relief from exclusion proceedings has been 
available nunc pro tunc.286 Although the class of aliens that is eligi­
ble for the waiver has been gradually reduced, the discretionary 
waiver has survived the various amendments and recodifications to 
immigration laws through the years.287 The INA in 1952,288 the Im­
migration Act of 1990, and finally, the AEDPA of 1996 all pre­
served the ability to award section 212(c) waivers nunc pro tunc.289 
The agency's construction and the long-standing agency practice of 
affording section 212( c) relief nunc pro tunc reinforce its availabil­
ity.290 Despite its awareness of the practice of awarding section 
212(c) relief nunc pro tunc, Congress has not taken any explicit 
steps to preclude nunc pro tunc application of the waiver.291 
The IIRIRA finally repealed the section 212( c) discretionary 
waiver altogether in 1996.292 However, the federal rules promul­
gated by the EOIR and the Attorney General following St. Cyr 
provide that the waiver remains available to the fortunate few who 
were eligible for it under the law at the time they had pled guilty to 
284. 	 Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 310 (2d Cir. 2004). 
285. 	 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
286. See, e.g., In re A-, 31. & N. Dec. 168, 172 (B.I.A. 1948) (Attorney General 
authorizing a nunc pro tunc exercise of the seventh proviso to section 3 and granting the 
alien lawful admission as of the original date of entry under the Immigration Act of 
1917); In re L-, 11. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 1940) (correcting petitioner's record of entry 
nunc pro tunc to allow the Secretary of Labor to grant a discretionary waiver). 
287. 	 Edwards, 393 F.3d at 309. 
288. E.g., In re S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392, 394-96 (Att'y Gen. 1955); see Edwards, 
393 F.3d at 310 ("[The BIA] review[ed] the legislative history of Immigration and Na­
tionality Act of 1952, and conclud[ed] that Congress, in recodifying the Seventh Proviso 
as § 212(c), did not intend to preclude nunc pro tunc awards of relief."}. 
289. 	 Edwards, 393 F.3d at 310. 
290. Patel v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 685, 694 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[T]he BIA has inter­
preted amendments to the INA restricting the availability of discretionary waivers of 
deportation not to eliminate its authority to issue nunc pro tunc orders granting such 
waivers."). 
291. 	 Edwards, 393 F.3d at 310 n.14 (referring to S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 394-96 ). 
292. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IIRIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304(b}, 110 Stat. 3009-597 (1996). 
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the aggravated felony offense that rendered them deportable.293 
Since the availability of the section 212(c) waiver persists and there 
is no record of congressional intent to revoke its availability,294 its 
applicability to nunc pro tunc should also endure. The fact that 
Congress barred convicted aggravated felons from the new form of 
discretionary waiver does not mean that it also meant to preclude 
them from section 212( c) relief if they were rightfully eligible. This 
line of reasoning offends the reason that the doctrine of nunc pro 
tunc exists as a remedy-for the sake of equity and to promote jus­
tice for the petitioner. 
B. 	 Application of Nunc Pro Tunc Is Consistent with Its Accepted 
and Common Use in the Immigration Context 
1. 	 Circumstances in Which Nunc Pro Tunc Is Available in 
Immigration 
BIA jurisprudence recognizes two well-defined circumstances 
in which it may allow nunc pro tunc proceedings.295 The first cir­
cumstance is when the only ground for deportability or inadmissi­
bility is eliminated by the granting of a nunc pro tunc order. The 
second circumstance is when the alien is granted an adjustment of 
status in connection with the grant of the appropriate waiver in or­
der to negate the order of deportation.296 In the circumstance at 
issue, the only ground for deportability would be eliminated if a 
nunc pro tunc order was granted. If a nunc pro tunc order is al­
lowed and the BIA deems the petitioner to be deserving of the 
waiver, a complete disposition of a petitioner's case would occur. 
Thus, the only ground for deportation would be eliminated by the 
nunc pro tunc order to adjudicate the alien's petition for section 
212(c) relief. 
2. 	 Nunc Pro Tunc and Principles of Equity in Immigration 
Inevitably, a mechanical application of immigration law will 
lead to unfair outcomes for certain noncitizens. Although Congress 
has made efforts to avoid such unfair results, reality illustrates that 
not everyone fits cleanly into the rigid regulatory scheme. Under 
293. Section 212(c) Relief for Certain Aliens in Deportation Proceedings Before 
April 24, 1996, 66 Fed. Reg. 6436 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 3,212,240). 
294. 	 Edwards, 393 F.3d at 310. 
295. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672, 679 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing 
Patel, 432 F.3d 685). 
296. 	 See discussion supra Part II.C.l. 
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many circumstances, a finding of deportability for particular nonci­
tizens offends our personal moral conscience and notions of jus­
tice.297 For this reason, the availability of an equitable remedy is 
tantamount. As an equitable remedy, nunc pro tunc has been in­
voked countless times throughout our common law history, with the 
primary purpose of promoting fairness to the parties inconve­
nienced by judicial error.298 In the immigration context, the BIA 
has exercised its nunc pro tunc authority even in the absence of 
agency error.299 
The measure of fairness to be given to victims of judicial error 
is "as justice may require."3°O Society's notions of fairness and jus­
tice dictate that the remedy must be proportionate to the error or 
the harm caused to the party. Consequently, the nunc pro tunc cor­
rection of a simple clerical omission by a court to correct the record 
is just as appropriate as allowing a nunc pro tunc petition for sec­
tion 212(c) relief where the agency's wrongful denial renders the 
petitioner ineligible for a discretionary waiver and, consequently, 
subject to deportation. 
In addition to prescribing a nunc pro tunc remedy to avoid ir­
reparable harm to the petitioner due to agency error, equity also 
demands that noncitizens who share the same basis for relief should 
be afforded the same opportunity to apply for a waiver from depor­
tation. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has previously 
held that "[f]undamental fairness dictates that permanent resident 
aliens who are in like circumstances, but for irrelevant and fortui­
tous factors, be treated in a like manner. "301 The court further 
stated: 
We do not dispute the power of Congress to create different stan­
dards of admission and deportation for different groups of aliens. 
However, once those choices are made, individuals within a par­
297. See generally Cook, supra note 89. 
298. WeiJ v. Markowitz, 898 F.2d 198, 200 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Mitchell v. 
Overman, 103 U.S. 62, 65 (1880». 
299. Patel, 432 F.3d at 694 ("BIA case law indicates that the BIA has the author· 
ity under the INA to issue nunc pro tunc orders even where there is no clear agency 
error."). 
300. Mitchell, 103 U.S. at 65. 
301. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 1976). It is interesting that, in this 
context, the court is willing to call the disparate treatment between lawful permanent 
residents who are being deported and those being excluded fundamentally unfair. Yet, 
no court has said that a group of lawful permanent residents facing deportation on the 
same grounds being treated disparately due to an erroneous legal interpretation is fun­
damentally unfair. 
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ticular group may not be subjected to disparate treatment on cri­
teria wholly unrelated to any legitimate governmental interest.302 
The Supreme Court, in St. Cyr, held that aliens who pled guilty to 
aggravated felony offenses that served as grounds for deportation 
should be allowed to apply for the section 212( c) relief that existed 
at the time of their plea agreements.303 Accordingly, this holding 
should apply to all aliens who were statutorily eligible for section 
212(c) relief at the time of their plea agreements. Those who had 
their section 212( c) petitions denied based on the erroneous retro­
active application of the AEDPA in Soriano should not have this 
right abrogated while those whose section 212( c) petitions are 
heard after Soriano was overturned were allowed to present their 
petitions on their merits.304 No legitimate governmental interest is 
served by treating these two groups of petitioners differently. 
St. Cyr serves to protect aliens who pled guilty to a deportable 
offense prior to the change in law. Undisputedly, these petitioners, 
who pled guilty prior to the 1996 laws, fall within that protected 
group. Petitioners, like Fernandes Pereira, had the misfortune of 
being among the first group of deportation proceedings held by the 
BIA after the 1996 changes and Soriano. Had their petitions been 
heard after Soriano was overturned, their petitions for section 
212(c) relief would have been adjudicated on their merits. Disal­
lowing nunc pro tunc relief to these aliens would circumvent the 
principles of St. Cyr and the other decisions by the federal courts 
below that overturned Soriano. Because nunc pro tunc should be 
properly invoked "to rectify any injustice suffered by [the peti­
tioner] on account of judicial delay," it would be properly invoked 
in this circumstance.305 
302. Id. (citation omitted). 
303. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001). 
304. This result would be a "capricious and whimsical" operation of immigration 
laws that the BIA itself concluded to be clearly unintended by Congress. In re L-, 1 1. 
& N. Dec. 1, 5 (B.LA. 1940); see discussion supra Part II.C.2.b. The BIA asserted that 
it would be a "capricious and whimsical" operation of the immigrations laws if the peti­
tioner was actually required to leave the country so that he would be able to apply for a 
waiver from exclusion at the border upon reentrance. Mitchell, 103 U.S. at 65. 
305. Wei! v. Markowitz, 829 F.2d 166, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). 
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3. 	 Nunc Pro Tunc Is Available in the Context of 

Immigration and Is Not Limited by the Courts' 

Traditional Nunc Pro Tunc Power 

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit distinguished be­
tween the nunc pro tunc authority held by the courts and the nunc 
pro tunc authority held by the BIA.306 It concluded that its own 
inherent nunc pro tunc power was limited to correction only of cler­
ical errors, even though the matter before the court concerned im­
migration.307 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit made a 
similar distinction, concluding that "the power of the BIA to enter 
nunc pro tunc orders is greater than that of federal courts. "308 
However, according to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
"[c]ourts, also, have relied on the doctrine, in order to return aliens 
to the position in which they would have been, but for a significant 
error in their immigration proceedings. "309 The court rejected the 
contention that, in order for a court to grant nunc pro tunc relief, 
the agency's conduct must rise to the level of a due process viola­
tion.310 The distinguishing factor in the issue at hand, according to 
the court, is that the petitioners are being deprived of the opportu­
nity to apply for relief from deportation, whereas previous cases 
involved illegal reentry.311 The court concluded that, where circum­
stances merit the exercise of equitable power in the immigration 
context, nunc pro tunc relief may be properly awarded regardless of 
which adjudicatory body is rendering the decision.312 
While it may be ideal for the BIA to address whether petition­
ers should be granted their request for nunc pro tunc relief, it is not 
out of the question for the solution to this problem to originate 
from the courts. For example, it was the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit that first held that section 212(c) should be applied 
306. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672, 677-78 (5th Cir. 2007) (dis­
cussing Patel v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 685 (6th Cir. 2005». 
307. [d. at 678-79 ("Like the First Circuit, we do not believe that the courts' nunc 
pro tunc authority is any broader in the context of immigration than it is in other 
contexts. "). 
308. Patel, 432 F.3d at 694. 
309. Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 308-09 (2d Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Batanic v. INS, 
12 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., Castillo-Perez v. INS, 212 F.3d 518, 528 (9th 
Cir. 2000). While the Castillo-Perez court did not specifically label its remedy as a nunc 
pro tunc remedy, it remanded the case with instructions to "apply the law as it existed 
at the time of Castillo's hearing before the [immigration judge]." [d. 
310. Edwards, 393 F.3d at 311. 
311. [d. 
312. [d. at 311-12. 
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to deportation proceedings and not be limited to exclusion proceed­
ings.313 The BIA subsequently made the decision to adopt this po­
sition314 and has applied the rule in this manner ever since. In a 
similar vein, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the ini­
tiative to administer a nunc pro tunc remedy.315 Not only is this 
exercise of a broader nunc pro tunc authority permissible, it also 
has the potential to save judicial time. Instead of remanding the 
issue back to the BIA, the court can decide the issue itself without 
further delay. 
C. The Proper Use of Nunc Pro Tunc for Section 212(c) Relief 
1. The Office of Nunc Pro Tunc: Correction of Errors 
When a denial of adjudication of a section 212( c) petition is 
based solely on an erroneous retroactive application of a newly en­
acted law, nunc pro tunc should be applied to remedy the error.316 
Generally, nunc pro tunc is an option for relief when there is an 
error or omission, either committed by inadvertence or mistake, 
that has resulted in injustice to the parties.317 In this circumstance, 
the reliance on Soriano's improper interpretation of the AEDPA 
led to the wrongful denial of section 212(c) petitions.318 Regardless 
of whether this error was committed by inadvertence or mistake, 
the result caused great injustice to the petitioners, because it barred 
them from their last opportunity to seek relief from deportation. 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that the 
standards established by Mitchell v. Overman and its progeny man­
date that nunc pro tunc relief be awarded "where agency error 
would otherwise result in an alien being deprived of the opportu­
nity to seek a particular form of deportation relief."319 A complete 
rectification of this error should not only involve reopening immi­
313. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 270 (2d Cir. 1976). 
314. In re Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (1976) (adopting the position of the Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Francis). 
315. The circumstances of the petitioners who appear before the court merit the 
exercise of such an equitable remedy. In the case of petitioner Edwards, the court of 
appeals not only reinstated Edwards' eligibility for a section 212(c) waiver, it granted 
the waiver. This is a logical move because Edwards had been previously granted a 
waiver, but it was erroneously revoked based on Soriano. This exercise of nunc pro 
tunc is an especially efficient use of judicial time. 
316. Edwards, 393 F.3d at 312. 
317. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 132, at 1100. 
318. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672, 674 (5th Cir. 2007). 
319. Edwards, 393 F.3d at 311 (applying Mitchell v. Overman, 103 U.S. 62 
(1880». 
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gration proceedings for petitioners who were eligible for section 
212(c) relief at the time of their guilty pleas, but also provide the 
opportunity for them to be heard on their section 212(c) petitions. 
2. The Duty to Employ a Nunc Pro Tunc Remedy 
Now that it is widely recognized and accepted that Soriano was 
decided incorrectly,32o steps should be taken to ameliorate the dam­
age done to petitioners who were adversely affected by the deci­
sion. It is not enough simply to reopen deportation hearings only to 
determine that a petitioner's eligibility has lapsed since his original 
deportation hearing and deny the section 212(c) waiver on that 
ground. This would be an incomplete remedy. The BIA must adju­
dicate the petition on its merits. In order to do this, the BIA must 
evaluate the petition as if it were hearing it at the time of the origi­
nal deportation proceedings.321 In Mitchell v. Overman,322 the 
Court held that "[a] nunc pro tunc order should be "granted ... so 
as to avoid entering an erroneous decree."323 According to St. Cyr, 
denial of a section 212(c) petition to those who were eligible for the 
waiver at the time of their plea agreements would be erroneous. 
Therefore, nunc pro tunc relief should be granted in order to avoid 
this outcome. 
Not only should adjudicatory bodies employ nunc pro tunc in 
order to avoid entering an erroneous decree, they should also do so 
because of the duty to remedy the error. In coming to its decision, 
the Mitchell Court relied on the legal maxim actus curiae neminem 
gravabit324 to conclude that when a delay is within the control of 
the court and "not attributable to the laches of the parties," a court 
has the duty to enter a nunc pro tunc decree to avoid injustice.325 
Other courts have asserted that the office of nunc pro tunc is "to 
enter an order which should have been made as a matter of course 
320. Romero-Rodriguez, 488 F.3d at 674 ("It is indisputable that [Soriano], as it 
relates to § 212 eligibility, was in error. "). 
321. If the BIA adjudicates the petition for waiver at the time of the second de­
portation hearing after the case is reopened, the petitioner will be found ineligible on 
the requirement of having served no more than five years in prison. In almost every 
instance, this action would effectively bar the petitioner's application, which leads one 
to question why the BIA would bother to reopen the proceedings in the first place. 
322. Mitchell, 103 U.S. 62. 
323. Id. at 65. 
324. See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
325. Mitchell, 103 U.S. at 65. 
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and as a legal duty."326 Thus, when the agency commits an error, 
regardless of whether it was clerical or a mistaken legal interpreta­
tion, a duty to correct the error is created. It is not the mere idea of 
equity that obligates an agency or court to correct its own errors, 
but also accountability to those in the system and the integrity of 
the system itself that demands such relief. Failing this, there would 
be no other check to prevent the "arbitrary exercise of governmen­
tal power. "327 
v. THE NUNC PRO TUNC OPERATION OF SECTION 212(c): 
A REALISTIC LOOK AT ITS PURPOSE AND EFFECT 
ON CRIMINAL ALIENS 
The preceding Part established that a nunc pro tunc remedy is 
permissible and should be applied in cases where the petitioner's 
section 212( c) application was wrongfully denied on the basis of 
Soriano. Since a nunc pro tunc remedy is available, it must be de­
termined how nunc pro tunc will apply. This Part discusses the 
proper date to which a nunc pro tunc order should relate back. In 
addition, it reiterates what factors are required in order for the peti­
tioner to be eligible for a nunc pro tunc remedy. 
A. 	 Applying Nunc Pro Tunc to Bring the Petitioner Back to the 
Time of the Final Deportation Hearing 
Since nunc pro tunc is a proper remedy to effectuate the adju­
dication of a section 212(c) petition to aliens denied a hearing based 
on Soriano, the next logical issue concerns its technical applica­
tion-determining the proper date to which the order should relate 
back. Given the procedural progression of deportation, there are 
several plausible points in time: (1) the date of application for a 
section 212(c) waiver;328 (2) the time of the immigration judge's or­
der of deportation;329 (3) the BIA's issuance of its final order of 
326. Haray v. Haray, 265 N.W. 466, 469 (Mich. 1936) (quoting City of Grand 
Rapids v. Coit, 114 N.W. 880 (Mich. 1908». 
327. See Morawetz, supra note 56, at 125 (discussing the arguments for abandon­
ment of the plenary power doctrine in favor of "contemporary notions of the role of the 
courts in checking the arbitrary exercise of governmental power"). 
328. This proposition was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in Buitrago-Cuesta v. INS, 7 F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1993). 
329. The petitioner in Greenidge v. INS, 263 F. Supp. 2d 696 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), had 
not served five years in prison at the time of his hearing before an immigration judge. 
During the time between the immigration judge's decision and his appeal before the 
BrA, he reached the five-year mark. The BrA denied the petitioner's application for 
relief because he was no longer eligible and stated that "'changes in law or fact occur­
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deportation; (4) the time of the hearing before an immigration 
judge after the case has been reopened;330 or (5) the date of the 
appeal to the BIA after the case has been reopened.331 Of these 
possibilities,332 the most persuasively logical time which to date 
back to is the time of the first administrative hearing before the 
BIA, when the final original deportation order is issued. 
The date of the final deportation order is when the BIA affirms 
a deportation order made by an immigration judge.333 As the Su­
preme Court stated in Stone v. INS, a deportation order "become[ s] 
final upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Ap­
peals. "334 It is the most appropriate date because it is when the 
petitioner is functionally adversely affected by the application of 
the erroneous retroactive interpretation by the agency. At this 
point, the petitioner has proceeded through the full administrative 
immigration process, including an administrative appeal.335 The 
fact that a final deportation order is reviewable when it is issued 
does not detract from the "finality" of the order, even when there is 
ring during the pendency of administrative appeals must be taken into account.' Ac­
cordingly, the court instructed that 'the time aliens spend in prison during the course of 
a hearing for purposes of rendering them ineligible for § 212(c) relief' must be consid­
ered." Id. at 699 (quoting Anderson v. McElroy, 953 F.2d 803, 806 (2d Cir. 1992». 
330. The arguments against using this date as the proper date to determine 
whether a petitioner has served five years in prison would be the same as those against 
designating the original hearing before the immigration judge as the proper date. The 
main issue being that the immigration judge's deportation order is not final at this 
point. 
331. In Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, the BIA argued that the proper measure 
of the time the petitioner serves in prison, for purposes of the section 212(c) waiver, is 
until the time of the BIA's final decision after the case is reopened. Romero-Rodriguez 
v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672, 676 (5th Cir. 2007). Following a Chevron analysis, the Court 
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that (1) the language of section 212(c) is 
ambiguous and, therefore, (2) the BIA's interpretation of section 212(c) is not imper­
missible. Id. The court, however, also concluded that if nunc pro tunc is determined to 
be available, it would serve to reinstate the petitioner's eligibility for the section 212(c) 
waiver. Id. at 679. 
332. A final possible date for determining eligibility for section 212( c) is the date 
an appellate court acts on a petition for review of the BIA's order, or when the time for 
filing a petition has elapsed. This contention is rarely made, even by the BIA, since 
petitioners are usually barred from section 212( c) eligibility prior to this time. 
333. 8 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 104.13[3][d], at 104­
82. 
334. Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 390 (1995) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1977». 
335. 8 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LoEHR, supra note 6, § 104.13[3][d], at 104­
82 ("The INA defines a 'final order of deportation' to mean an [immigration judgers 
order of deportability that is not timely appealed, or an order by the BIA affirming an 
immigration judge's deportation order." (quoting INA § 101(a)(47), 8 U.S.c. 
§ 1l01(a)(47))). 
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a subsequent filing of a motion to reconsider.336 Therefore, this is 
the point at which the erroneous interpretation of Soriano effec­
tively barred the petitioner's request for section 212( c) relief and, 
thus, is the proper date for the remedy. 
Since the Immigration Act of 1990337 amended section 212(c) 
by adding the requirement that aliens convicted of aggravated felo­
nies must serve less than five years in prison, various courts have 
determined that the appropriate date for assessing whether an alien 
has served the requisite five years in prison is the date of the alien's 
final administrative order by the BIA.338 In a notable 1993 decision 
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the court held that 
since a petitioner can accumulate time for purposes of achieving 
seven continuous years of lawful domicile during the pendency of 
his appeal from a decision by an immigration judge, he can also 
accumulate the time served in prison for purposes of determining 
the applicability of the five-year bar.339 Additionally, in Gomes v. 
Ashcroft, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit explicitly held 
that, for the purpose of determining a petitioner's eligibility for sec­
tion 212( c) relief, "the relevant date is when the BIA issued its 
decision. "340 
336. Stone, 514 U.S. at 405. 
337. See discussion supra Part 1.A.3. 
338. See, e.g., Montrevil v. Gonzales, 174 F. App'x 751 (4th Cir. 2006) (per 
curiam); Gomes v. Ashcroft, 311 F.3d 43, 45 (1st Cir. 2002); Buitrago-Cuesta v. INS, 7 
F.3d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1993). 
339. Buitrago-Cuesta, 7 F.3d at 296. 
340. Gomes, 311 F.3d at 45. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit relied 
heavily on Gomes in deciding Fernandes Pereira. This reliance is seriously flawed, how­
ever. One major distinction recognized by the Fernandes Pereira court itself is that by 
the time the BIA issued its final order of deportation, Gomes had already served five 
years in prison. Fernandes Pereira v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 2005), reh'g 
denied en bane, 436 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2006). In Gomes, the petitioner's claim that he was 
entitled to section 212(c) relief was based on the date he filed the application, not the 
date of the BIA's final deportation order. See Gomes, 311 F.3d at 45. Another point of 
distinction between Gomes and Fernandes Pereira is that Gomes was convicted by a 
jury, whereas Fernandes Pereira pled guilty to his aggravated felony conviction. See 
Fernandes Pereira, 7 F.3d at 40; Gomes, 311 F.3d at 44. The Supreme Court in St. Cyr 
concluded that because it would retroactively change the consequences of accepting a 
plea agreement, application of the 1996 law was impermissible for those who had pled 
guilty prior to the change. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 325-26 (2001). The issue of 
whether those convicted in a jury trial are eligible for section 212( c) relief remains 
largely unanswered and is the source of another split between the federal circuit courts. 
Of the courts that have addressed this question, only the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
has definitively allowed a petitioner who was convicted by a jury to apply for section 
212(c) relief after the 1996 changes. See Ponnapula v. Ashcroft, 373 F.3d 480, 496 (3d 
Cir. 2004); see also Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 634-35 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding 
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also supports the 
proposition that a nunc pro tunc order operates to bring the peti­
tioner back to the date of the BIA's final deportation order. While 
the court did not name this particular date, it asserted that 
"[ a ]l1owing [the petitioner] to file his application nunc pro tunc 
would, in fact, reinstate his § 212 eligibility."341 For such an appli­
cation of nunc pro tunc, the proper date for determining the peti­
tioner's eligibility must be the date of the BIA's final deportation 
order. This would not only be consistent with the court's construc­
tion of nunc pro tunc relief, but it would also remain consistent with 
the courts that have previously discussed the issue. 
INS regulations also support the proposition that the effective 
nunc pro tunc date should be the final administrative hearing.342 
Section 1003.2(c)(1) of title 8 of the Code of Federal Regulations 
states: 
[A] motion to reopen proceedings for consideration or further 
consideration of an application for relief under section 212(c) of 
the Act ... may be granted if the alien demonstrates that he or 
she was statutorily eligible for such relief prior to the entry of the 
administratively final order of deportation. 343 
This regulation affords criminal aliens who were still eligible for 
section 212( c) relief, not having served in excess of five years im­
prisonment, the opportunity to apply for relief if, at the time of 
their final order of deportation, they still met all of the eligibility 
requirements. Therefore, the operative date from which a nunc pro 
tunc order would be effective should correspond to the date of the 
administrative final order of deportation. 
B. 	 Nunc Pro Tunc Adjudication of Section 212(c) Petitions on 
Their Merits: What Factors Must Exist in Order to Be 
Eligible 
Because of the complexity of the issue discussed in this Note, 
the importance of timing and the myriad variations of circum­
stances under which a petitioner would seek nunc pro tunc relief, it 
that only certain legal permanent residents with pre-AEDPA convictions may be eligi­
ble for relief). 
341. Romero-Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 672, 679 (5th Cir. 2007). In so 
holding, the court expressly rejected the BIA's position that a nunc pro tunc order 
would not undo the fact that the petitioner had served in excess of five years in prison. 
Id. 
342. 	 Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299, 307 (2d Cir. 2004). 
343. 	 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1) (2007) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
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is useful to summarize what factors are necessary for a petitioner to 
be eligible for a nunc pro tunc adjudication of his application for 
section 212( c) waiver. The following factors illustrate the narrow­
ness of this remedy. 
First, the petitioner must be a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States who has pled guilty to a crime constituting an aggra­
vated felony. This guilty plea must have rendered the petitioner 
subject to deportation344 and must have occurred prior to the enact­
ment of the AEDPA and IIRIRA in 1996. It is necessary that the 
petitioner was incarcerated and that the INS initiated deportation 
proceedings against him. Second, the petitioner, who is eligible for 
a section 212( c) waiver as it was written prior to its repeal, must be 
denied the opportunity to apply for it based on the BIA's decision 
in Soriano. Finally, at the date of the final administration hearing 
before the BIA, the petitioner must have served less than.five years 
In pnson. 
It should be noted that petitioners who already had the oppor­
tunity to have their applications for a section 212( c) waiver adjudi­
cated should not be given the nunc pro tunc opportunity to do so 
again. In the event that the application for waiver was originally 
denied on its merits, an adjudicatory body should adopt that deci­
sion.345 If the waiver was originally granted, a court should rein­
state that decision and grant the waiver without remanding the case 
for adjudication.346 The function of granting nunc pro tunc relief 
should be to allow the petitioner to be heard on the merits of his 
application, not to grant him a chance to have the matter 
readjudicated. 
Applying nunc pro tunc in these circumstances is not a guaran­
tee that an alien's petition for a section 212(c) waiver will be suc­
344. The petitioner must not be deportable for any other reason, especially for 
illegal entry, because the nunc pro tunc doctrine applies only when the grounds for 
deportation are eliminated by its use. 
345. In addition to finding the petitioner in Gomes v. Ashcroft ineligible for sec­
tion 212(c) relief, the immigration judge in Gomes alternatively denied Gomes's 212(c) 
petition on its merits. When considering the petition on pre-AEDPA law, the immigra­
tion judge still denied relief upon his findings that Gomes had (1) committed multiple 
acts of rape for which he would not accept responsibility, (2) no significant familial ties 
in the United States (no one came to testify on his behalf), and (3) a serious addiction 
to drugs and alcohol that he was unable to control. Gomes v. Ashcroft, No. 01-30160­
MAP, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6323, at *14 (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2002), affd, 311 F.3d 43 
(1st Cir. 2002). This is yet another reason why the Fernandes Pereira court's reliance on 
Gomes was amiss. Fernandes Pereira's petition had not been heard on its merits. 
346. This was the action taken by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
Edwards v. INS, 393 F.3d 299 (2d Cir. 2004). See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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cessful, nor is it intended to be. It is intended to ensure that all 
aliens are properly given the opportunity to be heard; a right that is 
so deeply engrained in our judicial system and our sense of justice 
that it cannot be ignored for the sake of mere convenience. Al­
though the nature of the waiver is discretionary, the opportunity to 
apply for the waiver should be given uniformly. Uniformity can be 
accomplished by allowing nunc pro tunc adjudication of these peti­
tioners' applications on their merits.347 
CONCLUSION 
Although allowing nunc pro tunc relief in such circumstances 
would only be beneficial to a limited number of petitioners,348 it 
would make an enormous difference to the few who are granted a 
section 212( c) waiver. For those whose livelihood and sole sense of 
identity are tied to the United States, it means a continued exis­
tence as they have had for years, perhaps the majority of their lives. 
Many noncitizens who are ordered to leave the United States risk 
losing their homes, families, and personal security for their indiscre­
tions, which in some cases are relatively minor offenses. Subjecting 
U.S. citizens to this type of punishment would cause an outrage. 
But because of the statutory line between citizens and noncitizens, 
noncitizens suffer more dire consequences than their citizen 
counterparts. 
In a country torn between the competing interests of national 
security and protection of individual rights, immigration law has 
served as a battleground for these interests. As many immigration 
reform advocates would agree, there simply is never a politically 
good time to reform immigration laws. Considered to be a Pan­
dora's box of controversy, immigration reform is subordinated to 
whatever higher-priority agenda the government seeks to pursue 
and, because of this, it has not been given the attention that it de­
serves. Being that there is no acceptable systematic immigration 
reform in sight, preserving the availability of equitable relief in im­
migration is of the utmost importance. 
347. Since the creation of the DHS, the EOIR has been designated as the proper 
forum to review petitions for section 212(c) waivers. Edwards, 393 F.3d at 302 n.l. 
348. This already limited class of potential petitioners is also decreasing as more 
time elapses from the passage of the 1996 laws. The April 25, 2005, deadline for mo­
tions to reopen for reevaluation of section 212(c) claims has lapsed, limiting adjudica­
tion for section 212(c) claims to petitioners whose deportation proceedings are newly 
initiated by the DHS. 
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Immigration laws are perpetually changing because of govern­
ment policies that affect aliens. A noncitizen's rights should not be 
arbitrarily dismissed because of such changes. Because of the infi­
nite factual permutations that arise out of the unique circumstances 
of each person's life, nunc pro tunc should be an available form of 
relief. It is impossible for two people to go through life accumulat­
ing the same experiences, and it is likewise impossible for two peo­
ple to come before the INS by reason of the same deportable 
ground and have the same favorable factors. The INS must be flex­
ible in applying the law to preserve the alien's rights, not just as a 
lawful permanent resident in the United States, but as a human 
being. 
The fact that these cases are still being litigated more than ten 
years after the enactment of the AEDPA and IIRIRA should serve 
as a strong deterrent to Congress from creating laws, particularly 
immigration laws-given their uncommon constitutional charac­
ter-that have retroactive effects. The policy decisions behind the 
laws reflect the confusion and tension in reconciling the desire, on 
one hand, to take a solid stance against terrorism and illegal immi­
gration, and the often contravening desire, on the other hand, to 
protect the rights of persons regardless of their status of citizenship. 
The wave of litigation caused by the 1996 Acts affecting immi­
gration laws should serve as ample deterrence for passing laws with 
retroactive effect without first contemplating their consequences. 
The endeavor to avoid such an oversight may ultimately fail, which 
is why nunc pro tunc should be preserved as a saving grace for the 
deserving potential deportees who would otherwise suffer the cata­
strophic effects of expulsion. 
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